Oxford Policy Management

Final Evaluation of the Fair Water Futures Project *(Uhakika wa Maji)* in Tanzania

Final Report

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Acknowledgements

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The evaluation was undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The OPM team comprised a national sector specialist, Willie Mwaruvanda and an evaluation specialist, Lucrezia Tincani. The report was quality assured by senior social development expert Andrew Kardan.

Executive summary

Introduction

The overall purpose of this independent evaluation was to provide a comprehensive understanding of what was achieved by the Fair Water Futures project, known locally as *Uhakika wa Maji* (hereafter Uhakika). In particular, the evaluation aimed to understand the factors which contributed to the successes and challenges faced by the project, as well as to draw out lessons for similar social accountability monitoring (SAM) and advocacy initiatives on water, in Tanzania and elsewhere.

Uhakika ran from April 2013 until March 2016, with a total budget of £249,999 funded by a DFID's Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) Innovation Grant (now renamed UK Aid Direct). The project was led by Water Witness International (WWI), in partnership with the Tanzanian non-governmental organisation (NGO) Shahidi wa Maji, government institutions directly involved in water resource management (WRM), and the Tanzania Network for Water and Sanitation, each of whom contributed core team members who carried out direct project activities. Additional water sector stakeholders were also involved in an advisory function, through the Project Advisory Committee (PAC).

Community-level activities were implemented across ten sites in Tanzania, with the intention of reaching 240,000 people with improved levels of water security. The project had the long-term goal of improving sector performance more widely, to ensure that the water which vulnerable people need for their livelihoods is legally recognised and protected from pollution, depletion and competing claims. It aimed to achieve this by using SAM to generate evidence about the performance of government agencies responsible for the sustainable management of water resources, and to produce advocacy material drawn from this evidence to improve sector performance on WRM.

This executive summary focuses on achievements and challenges for both community-level and national-level activities, after a brief summary of these for the project overall. The summary ends with recommendations for future programmes. Only brief evaluative conclusions are given here – the full report provides the evidence behind each conclusion.

Evaluation approach

The evaluation is based on a two-week visit to Tanzania and extensive review of project documentation. Community members in four project sites were interviewed, in addition to members of government agencies responsible for water management, key sector donors, civil society organisations (CSOs) and international non-governmental organisations (iNGOs) and project staff.

Overall achievements

Overall, the project implemented the vast majority of its planned activities by project end, thanks to sustained efforts by the project team in-country. Activities were delivered on budget, and the project experienced only minor delays in delivery. At community-level, considerable progress was made towards raising the voice of small community-level water users. The project directly contributed towards increased water security for 159,000 people. At sector level, the project made important contributions to raising the profile of WRM, both within and outside the water sector. It highlighted specific, systemic challenges facing WRM processes, showcased the impacts these are having on communities using insights from case studies, and built the capability of civil society groups to positively influence the sector. This is likely to contribute to increased funding allocations to WRM in future. Few people would have predicted in 2013 that such a short-term advocacy project would have been able to contribute to tangible improvements in water security within only three years; the efforts that have been put in to achieve these results must be commended.

Overall challenges

The main challenges facing the project were limited project funds and a short time-frame, given that advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts. Limited project funds permitted only two full-time equivalents as staff members, and the project was vulnerable to staff turnover and highly dependent on the commitment and skills of key personnel as a result. Restricted personnel and financial resources also limited the regularity of engagement with disparate project communities and project partners, who themselves faced high levels of staff turnover. In terms of external challenges, the sensitive political climate around the October 2015 presidential elections posed some challenges, and caused delays, for community and advocacy work. The project's full contribution is not yet visible in some logframe indicators at impact and outcome level, as advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts. However, the advocacy work planned for mid-2016 with funding levered by this initial UK Aid Direct investment is likely to contribute to increased funding allocations to WRM in future.

Overall relevance of the project approach

The project's concept is highly relevant to the Tanzanian water sector, which currently faces multiple challenges in delivering water security: Due to increasing and competing water demands and ineffective WRM, there is a risk that water users with a less powerful voice will receive less equitable access to, or legal protection of, the water resources they need for health, livelihoods and economic development. As a result, the choice of a SAM framework is an appropriate design for raising the voice of less powerful water users. Therefore the project's choice of focusing its community work on small community-level water users who have a weaker voice on water is highly relevant. The project intended to raise the voice of these marginalised water users by increasing their capability to express their views and to demand their rights and entitlements, and by doing so to contribute to a more equitable WRM. Project sites were selected that were well suited for such advocacy purposes. The project was designed in such a way that if the government was responsive to the demands of small-scale community-level users, this would improve water security for project communities in the immediate future. If not, the project could use their lack of response to obtain insights into the root causes of poor performance within the sector, and could use these insights for advocacy work.

Achievements of community-level work

At community level, the project was effective in empowering project change agents ('Mashahidi' – water witnesses, in Kiswahili) to generate and implement Action Plans (APs), with the intention of improving the protection of water resources which communities depend on for their livelihoods:

- Ten sites were selected for the implementation of community-based activities. During initial site visits a variety of participatory approaches were used to explore the nature and severity of water insecurity issues faced, and identify those community groups that were most affected. 603 people engaged in this participatory analysis across the ten project sites and **90% reported improved awareness of water resource rights, obligations and institutional responsibilities**.
- 84 community members volunteered to become Mashahidi. Of these, the project worked closely with 37 Mashahidi across eight project sites[1]. **Overall, 92% reported having a greater understanding of legal rights, obligations and responsibilities relating to water security, and reported an intention to act on this knowledge.** All Mashahidi interviewed through the evaluation stated that they gained a better understanding of the responsibilities of institutions, including how to apply for a water use permit (WUP) and who to contact within the relevant authorities. As a result of this, the Mashahidi interviewed felt that the project directly contributed to helping their views be better expressed and better heard.

[1] Activities in two out of ten project sites were put on hold pending additional funding under Phase II.

- **While some agreed APs took longer to be implemented, the majority (87%) were implemented across eight project sites by project end**. Community-level activities were delivered at a lower cost than planned (£0.79 per person, compared to £1.00). The project used its limited resources efficiently thanks to tight financial management.

- Achieving positive impacts for the water security of affected communities was an ambitious objective within the three-year time-frame. Nonetheless, the project contributed to positive impacts in many communities. Positive impacts were more likely where the response to an AP was more within the control of the project or community, or where the solutions were within relatively easy reach of responsible authorities. Examples of improvements in water security achieved include the reduced dumping of solid waste, supporting processes for the construction of a new water treatment facility, and more secure water supply achieved through WUPs issued, and by helping to establish or helping to strengthen two Water User Associations (WUAs). **Overall, the project directly contributed towards increased water security for 159,000 people**. In the two project sites where WUPs were secured, communities felt that thanks to having a more secure water supply they were able to have more reliable agricultural yields. One irrigation scheme was able to use their WUP as collateral to secure a financial loan.

Challenges for community-level work

The tight time-frame, limited funds and limited staffing of the project posed minor challenges for the implementation of community-level work. **Some Mashahidi reported that more frequent visits by project staff would have allowed APs to be implemented more quickly, and would have improved and maintained their motivation.** The budget allowed most project sites to be visited three to four times during the three-year project. Funding shortfalls also posed challenges in regard to establishing a support network through which Mashahidi could continue to obtain advice and minor financial support after project end. **Mashahidi from four out of the six interviewed communities felt they could have benefited from targeted training to allow them to continue to pursue responsible government agencies alone after project end.**

- In terms of external factors, the motivation of Mashahidi themselves played a role in whether the issues flagged in APs were pursued persistently enough with the government to solicit a response. **Nine out of 37 Mashahidi became less active over the project lifecycle, which appears to be one of the reasons why not all APs were implemented.**
- **A key challenge was securing a favourable response from relevant government authorities on WUP application and on pollution control within the project time-frame**. Twelve out of 18 WUP applications (relating to two project sites) were successful and one out of three sites saw enforcement action on pollution by responsible authorities. Those water security achievements that were associated with legal recognition of water rights (WUPs issued; WUA processes strengthened) are highly likely to continue to be protected in future. However, the unintended water security improvements achieved thanks to awareness-raising by Mashahidi may not be sustained as there is a risk that communities may resume waste dumping in rivers, and may not continue flood-protection measures for their agricultural fields.
- **It was challenging to manage expectations at community level in some project sites, where the project was not able to facilitate a resolution to their water issues within the project time-frame.** Some Mashahidi who did not receive a favourable response to their AP request intended to pursue a more confrontational approach. In two sites affected by pollution, Mashahidi for example intended to contact the media. Confrontational approaches could jeopardising the project's constructive advocacy approach with the government but so far **no evidence of negative impacts was found**, such as reprisals as a result of advocacy work.

Achievements of national-level advocacy work and dissemination activities

The advocacy strategy was designed mid-way through the project; deliberately phased so that it could be informed by insights from the community-level work. Advocacy activities were designed to raise the knowledge and awareness of government staff and political leaders, of key stakeholders within and outside the water sector, and of the general public on water management issues and the structural constraints that underlie them – and to instil a greater sense of ownership over, and a duty to resolve, these issues. The intended outcome of these activities according to the logframe was to increase budget allocation to the Basin Water Boards (BWBs), frontline authorities of the Ministry for Water and Irrigation (MoWI), with the impact of improving sector performance. Most advocacy activities were completed at the time of the evaluation.

- **Four national 'learning-by-doing' workshops with government and other sector stakeholders were successful in raising awareness amongst attendees**. Of the 110 individuals who attended, 76% reported newly acquired capability and intent to apply the knowledge gained. Furthermore, involving BWB and National Environment Management Council (NEMC) staff directly in the implementation of community-level project activities also provided the unintended benefits of enhanced workplace motivation amongst staff.
- **The project generated important insights into the specific challenges relating to WRM processes**, **and showcased the impacts this is having on communities using insights from case studies.** These were communicated to government, donors and the public. **The presentations at the Joint Water Sector Review (JWSR) in 2014 and 2015 were particularly effective.** Advocacy messages aimed at the public included TV spots and radio dramas.
- **A participatory analysis of the budget allocation, expenditure flows and staffing levels** within MoWI was undertaken in 2014. This analysis clearly highlighted the staffing and funding shortfalls facing BWBs, allowing the project to advocate for increased allocations to BWBs.
- To share the approach and lessons-learned of the project, a project handbook was produced and shared at a regional learning event attended by national CSOs and by regional CSO from eight African countries. Insights were also shared with global practitioners though a variety of webinars and conferences, including at Stockholm World Water Week.

Challenges for national advocacy work and dissemination activities

The tight time-frame, **limited project funds and limited staffing of the project** posed challenges as regards the extent of advocacy work that could be undertaken. As a result, outreach work planned with parliament and the technical policy briefs were delayed until mid-2016. Limited project funds also posed some challenges in regard to the depth and quality of the budget and expenditure analysis undertaken in 2014, as the difficulties in obtaining reliable data on budgets from government stretched the resources available for this work.

In terms of external factors beyond the project's control:

- The political climate around the Oct 2015 presidential elections caused delays to advocacy work. For example, the production of TV spots and radio dramas could only be aired in Feb. 2016.
- The availability of BWB and NEMC staff and staff turnover within donors posed some challenge in regard to sector engagement. High turnover within the project's regional partners (FAN and ANEW) also posed some challenges to disseminating the project's approach.
- The project's full contribution is not yet visible in some logframe indicators at impact and outcome level. Advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts, which posed challenges in setting impact-level indicators for advocacy work, given the extensive contextual factors affecting sector performance. While the project accompanied advocacy messages with clear recommendations, the technical policy briefs detailing how these recommendations could be implemented were not yet completed at the time of the evaluation,

which may have limited the project's impact on sector performance to date. As a result, while a four-fold increase in donor funding to WRM was seen over the lifetime of the project, interviewed donors reported that this was made independently of the project. However, advocacy work planned for mid-2016 with funding levered thanks to this project is likely to contribute to increased funding allocations to WRM in future.

Recommendations

The bullet points below set out key recommendations for immediate action by the project team (within six months):

- **Draw together policy guidance targeted at the upcoming water legislation reform** to inform the upcoming water legislation amendments planned by the Tanzanian government.
- **Update case study bulletins** to capture in detail the impacts achieved in each site, to demonstrate to others the value of the approach.
- **Capture practical lessons from project implementation and management** (specific examples of lessons to be captured provided in Section 5). These lessons would complement the handbook already drafted by the project, to ensure the rich insights of the team provide important learning for organisations hoping to replicate the approach in future.

The following bullet points set out the recommendations for the project team's future work on SAM in Tanzania, as well as replications of the approach in WWI's work in Zambia and elsewhere:

- **Draw up a detailed theory of change (TOC) to more clearly illustrate and communicate the design** of the project to an external audience.
- **At design stage, the political risks to project delivery should be more thoroughly assessed**, and should be accompanied by appropriate mitigation plans.
- **At design stage, ensure sufficient resourcing for on-going liaison and joint planning with government and donors,** to ensure that insights from advocacy work inform the government capacity-building work of other donors.
- **Secure sufficient funding for recruiting and retaining a large enough team of adequately experienced staff** to support more effective government, community and partner engagement. Such staffing would also allow government performance to be tracked more regularly, through annual budget and expenditure analysis.
- **Provide additional training and adequate resources and time to support monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and learning.** For example, additional training on M&E techniques for staff and clearer recording templates could facilitate more efficient M&E. Dedicated external or internal monitoring, evaluation and learning support should be considered.
- **Provide more structured support and advice for Mashahidi. Together with more regular engagement** this will increase the likelihood of Mashahidi continuing to engage with responsible government agencies in future.
- **Sufficient funding should be secured to allow a greater number of TAWASANET partners to be involved in direct project delivery,** in order to increase the likelihood of other organisations scaling up the approach in other regions of Tanzania.

Finally, the bullets below set out recommendations for promoting a SAM approach in future:

- Given the beneficial results seen from this project, both at community-level and at national level, and the regional and global interest expressed in the approach, **it is recommended that social accountability work within the WRM sector be continued and strengthened.**

- **It is recommended that a higher level of longer-term funding be made available to fund social accountability work.** The funds available via GPAF were too short-term to secure the full potential benefits of SAM for equitable WRM.
- **Donors involved in the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP) should collaborate more closely with social accountability initiatives** by sharing data on commitments and disbursements made and by engaging with the recommendations coming out of social accountability work.
- **To allow the approach to be adjusted for use in other countries, it is recommended to carry out detailed political economy analysis, and assessments of partner needs and capability** prior to designing the approach in each country, to ensure that the design reflects the sectoral context of the country.

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List of abbreviations

ANEW	African Civil Society Network on Water
AP	Action Plan
AR	Annual Report
BWB	Basin Water Board
CDOs	Community Development Officers
CSO	Civil society organisation
CVCA	Community Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
DWR	Directorate of Water Resources
EFA	Environmental Flow Assessment
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FAN	Freshwater Action Network
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GPAF	DFID-funded Global Poverty Action Fund
IDB	Internal Drainage Basin
iNGOs	International non-governmental organisations
IWMI	International Water Management Institute
IWRM	Integrated WRM
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JWSR	Joint Water Sector Review
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MoWI	Ministry for Water and Irrigation
NEMC	National Environmental Management Council
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NWB	National Water Board
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PAC	Project Advisory Committee

SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SAM	Social accountability monitoring
TAWASANET	Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network
TOC	Theory of change
TWG	Technical Working Group
TZS	Tanzania Shilling
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VEC	Village executive council
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WRM	Water resources management
WSDP	Water Sector Development Programme
WSSR	Water Sector Status Report
WUA	Water Users Association
WUP	Water use permit
WWF	World Wildlife Fund
WWI	Water Witness International

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of this end-of-project evaluation was to provide a comprehensive understanding of what has been achieved by the Fair Water Futures project, known in Kiswahili as *Uhakika wa Maji* (hereafter Uhakika). This evaluation unpicks the conditions which have contributed to the success of the project, while also highlighting the exogenous and endogenous challenges faced, with the aim of pulling out lessons for improving the programme in future, as well as lessons for similar SAM and advocacy initiatives on water in Tanzania and elsewhere. The intended audience for this report is the Department for International Development's (DFID) GPAF (now renamed UK Aid Direct), the funder of the project. However, given that Uhakika is the first systematic application of social accountability to improve WRM globally, the findings of the evaluation will be of wider interest. While the report aims to give a comprehensive overview of the project, further background information can be found at http://waterwitness.org/fair-water-futures, and from the team at WWI.

1.2 Context of the Tanzanian water sector

Tanzania's national water policy, laws and institutional framework for management of water resources are known for being some of the most progressive in Africa. They prioritise the needs of the environment and communities, establish rights and obligations backed up with penalties for non-compliance, and assign extensive statutory powers to government regulators whilst also reflecting the need for stakeholder participation in management of the resource. As part of the Uhakika project, WWI mapped the hierarchy of roles and responsibilities for WRM as set out in national policies, strategies and legislation (Sanga *et al.* 2014).

Despite several years of sector investment and capacity building, in practice many aspects of the institutional framework are only partially, or inadequately, implemented. One key constraint is staffing and funding shortfalls within BWBs, the frontline implementing bodies of the MoWI, co-ordinated by the Directorate of Water Resources (DWR). As a result, water users with a less powerful voice risk receiving less equitable access to, or legal protection of, the water resources they need for health, livelihoods and socio-economic development. The risks facing sustainable economic growth, climate resilience and poverty reduction because of ineffective WRM are particularly pressing because of rapidly increasing water demands for irrigated agriculture, municipal supply and industry.

The national WSDP aims to address capacity gaps and increase coordination across the sector. It has a 20-year vision and encompasses not only rural and urban water supply and sanitation but also WRM and measures to develop sector capacity. The WSDP is founded on a sector-wide approach to planning, including structures promoting dialogue across government and development partners, and its financing mechanisms include budget support administered via a basket fund (OPM 2013).

The WSDP is one the largest national water programmes operating in Africa today, with $1.3 billion spent under Phase I (2007–2014) and $3.27 billion earmarked for Phase II (2014–2019). The WSDP is, however, primarily funded by donors, with relatively low funding from the Tanzanian government. Some donor support for WRM also operates outside of WSDP planning.

Under Phase I, only 6% of funds were allocated to WRM. These funds focused on strengthening BWBs through renovation or construction of buildings, WRM networks, provision of vehicles and equipment, and preparation of Integrated WRM (IWRM) Plans for each river basin (OPM 2013). IWRM plans for six basins have been completed. The percentage earmarked for WRM increased to 24% under Phase II ($0.8 billion). These funds focused on (i) strengthening WRM to ensure availability of water for socio-economic development and environmental sustainability, and (ii) strengthening water quality management, with the aim of building institutional capacity for water quality management for public health and ecosystem integrity.

1.3 Overview of GPAF-funded activities

The Uhakika project ran from April 2013 until March 2016[2], with a total budget of £249,999. The GPAF Innovation Grant intended to encourage innovative approaches to poverty reduction in the context of the UK Government's commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)[3]. The project was led by WWI, in partnership with the Tanzanian NGO *Shahidi wa Maji,* government institutions directly involved in WRM, and TAWASANET, each of whom contributed core team members, who carried out direct project activities. Additional water sector stakeholders were also involved through the PAC.

The project adopted a SAM and advocacy approach to improve the water security[4] of vulnerable communities in Tanzania. By using SAM to highlight gaps in the sustainable protection and management of water resources by responsible government agencies, the project had the long-term goal of ensuring that the water that vulnerable people 'need for health maintenance, food production and income generation is legally recognised and protected from pollution, depletion and competing claims' (AR 2015). The project aimed to improve the water security of 240,000 people through a case study approach involving ten communities across four of the main river basins in Tanzania.

The project implementation took place over several steps (see Figure 1). Broadly speaking, the 'Action learning' phase (Steps 1–5) mapped the water security situation in Tanzania and collected evidence on the bottlenecks facing WRM in the project case study sites, and via a nationwide budget and resource analysis. Next, the insights gained were used to draw up and implement an evidence-based advocacy strategy and supporting communication materials, and to share learning about the approach (Steps 6–8). A summary of GPAF-funded activities is given in Table 1, with full progress against the log frame laid out in Annex B2).

Figure 1. Process steps of the project (from Hepworth *et al.* 2016)



[2] A no-cost extension was secured from 31 October until 31 December 2015 and an additional three months were made available after December for completing the evaluation and the forth project workshop. Phase II of the programme (April to October 2016) is currently underway with funds from the Scottish Government.

[3] From: www.gov.uk/guidance/global-poverty-action-fund-gpaf.

[4] The project draws on the definition of water security proposed by Grey and Sadoff (2005): water security is 'the reliable availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for production, livelihoods, ecosystems and health, coupled with an acceptable level of risk to water-related hazards including droughts, floods, conflict and pollution'. The project further emphasises that water security must be 'for all', and must be shared equitably (Hepworth *et al.* 2016).

1.4 Structure of the report

This remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- **Section 2** outlines the evaluation methodology and evaluation activities carried out in-country;
- **Section 3** presents the evaluation findings, structured along the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria;
- **Section 4** summarises the conclusions of the evaluation; and
- **Section 5** sets out the recommendations for different stakeholders.

The annexes provide the terms of reference of the evaluation, and further detail on the evaluation method and on the evaluation activities carried out in-country.

Table 1. GPAF-funded activities

Outputs	Inception	Action learning (June 2013 – December 2015)	Advocacy work (January 2015 – March 2016)
Outputs 1 and 2: **Community activation**	Project team recruited and office / logistics in place Multi-stakeholder PAC established	Water security situation analysis and institutional landscape mapping (report produced) Water security scan report produced Workshop held to share findings of institutional mapping and train partners on SAM approach (March 2014 report entitled 'Water Security for All') Ten case studies selected and poorest users identified Community awareness training and participatory analysis of issues (priority water problems assessed) Community Water Witnesses ('Mashahidi') recruited APs drawn up and initiated	Continued gathering of evidence on WRM issues by the community APs monitored/supported
Output 3**: Budget analysis**		Financial data collected. Workshop held to train stakeholders on methods, and then undertake participatory analysis of the budget allocation, expenditure flows and staffing levels within MoWI (report entitled 'Budget and Resource Analysis') Additional analysis undertaken to produce 'Where does the money flow?' report and a series of infographics	Meetings held to share/refine results with stakeholders Findings shared with MoWI, Donor Partner Group and at Stockholm World Water Week

Output 4: **Evidence-based advocacy**		Report on the institutional landscape of WRM in Tanzania Production of posters on simplified water policy and law in Swahili, and distribution of 1,200 posters to basin, district and village council offices	Workshop held to share insights from Uhakika's community work, deliver participatory training on high impact advocacy, and joint synthesis of evidence and production of Uhakika advocacy strategy (Report: "From evidence to advocacy") Constructive advocacy package developed based on the strategy Public advocacy through reports, briefings, and radio dramas and films aired on national and regional TV and radio Direct meetings with government duty bearers Presentations at Sector Technical Working Group and Joint Sector Review in 2014 and 2015 Attained a seat on the National Water Board until 2019
Output 5: **Participatory M&E and learning**		Baselines established Community evaluations done after each community engagement PAC meetings held Two learning-by-doing workshops held with national stakeholders and international members of Freshwater Action Network (FAN) Sharing insights and methodology with global practitioners: International Water Management Institute (IWMI), UK Water Forum, London Water Research Group, Stockholm World Water Week, and Water Integrity Forum.	Monthly or fortnightly management meetings Mid-term 'internal reflection' workshop held with WWI staff in May 2015 Two learning-by-doing workshops held with national stakeholder and international members of FAN network (see above: Advocacy workshop 2015 & Regional Learning Workshop 2016) Sharing approach and results at international conferences and webinars Independent evaluation undertaken

2 Evaluation methodology and approach

2.1 Logic and assumptions of the evaluation

The evaluation team chose a theory-based approach as such an approach allows WWI and UK Aid Direct to understand how Uhakika progressed, compared to what was planned, and to investigate whether the assumptions that the TOC makes are reasonable and realistic. Theory-based evaluations take a project's TOC as the starting point for the evaluation design. The evaluation team used the logframe, and the assumptions underlying it, the TOC elements present in Uhakika's first progress report (see Figure 12 in Annex C), and also drew on interviews with staff, to develop a high-level TOC to guide the evaluation (see Figure 2). The TOC was agreed with Uhakika staff after the completion of the country visit.

The TOC is intended as a graphical representation of how project activities were intended to lead to desired outputs, outcomes and impacts. Once the intentions are clearly set out, the TOC can then be used as an evaluation tool to identify and investigate key links in the logic that the TOC depicts, both in terms of the internal causal/contributory links it proposes as well as the key assumptions it is based on. Full details of our theory-based approach are set out in Annex A.2.

Through investigating key links in the logic that the TOC depicts the evaluation explored *what* was achieved, as well as understanding *how* the programme was implemented, and *why.* The evaluation questions are set out in Section 2.2. As part of the recommendations, some revisions to the TOC are proposed. These revisions seek to depict how project activities led to outcomes and impacts in practice, based on the evaluation team's understanding (see Annex B.1).

It is important to note that Uhakika aimed to bring about improvements in water security in the communities where it operated, as well as to act at as a catalyst for improved performance in the Tanzania water sector, through its advocacy work. However, it is clearly stated in the assumptions accompanying the project's logframe that factors outside of the project's control will influence the achievement of outcomes and impacts. To reflect this, the arrows at the bottom of the TOC indicate the sphere of control, the sphere of influence and the sphere of interest of the project.

Assumptions underpinning the TOC on the next page:

1. Assumes that APs capture local realities, and that the concerns of Mashahidi and actions are viable and adequately focused.
2. Assumes project staff have sufficient knowledge of WRM to raise awareness.
3. Assumes Mashahidi have the capacity and support needed to implement APs.
4. Assumes Mashahidi have the capacity and knowledge needed to raise awareness.
5. Assumes that institutions are capacitated and responsive to applications for legal recognition and protection; assumes that *de jure* legal entitlement reduces *de facto* conflict over water.
6. Assumes the right sector actors attend training and these actors have an interest in, and capacity in respect of, increasing the capacity of the sector.
7. Assumes workshops are tailored to participants so as to achieve effective skills transfer.
8. Assumes the analysis of community-level evidence is sufficiently resourced to generate the insights needed for advocacy work.
9. Assumes data can be obtained to undertake analysis of budget allocations and expenditure flows, and that the task is sufficiently resourced to allow it to be repeated annually to coincide with the annual budget review of the MoWI.
10. Assumes policy recommendations are shared with relevant government and sector actors in order to raise awareness on how policy bottlenecks could be overcome.
11. Assumes advocacy work is well received by the government.
12. Assumes CSOs and iNGOs have the capacity to replicate SAM work in their area.
13. Assumes that lack of accountability and evidence are key constraints to increased funding allocation and improved targeting of funds within the sector.

Figure 2. Uhakika's TOC (drawn up by the evaluation team)



(*) These activities were not yet carried out at the time of the evaluation

2.2 The evaluation questions

Given the purpose of the evaluation, the evaluation questions (see Table 2), focus both on *what* was achieved, as well as on understanding *how* the programme was implemented, and *why.* The evaluation questions were based on the standard set of evaluation questions proposed by UK Aid Direct and tailored to suit the needs of the evaluation. The questions were shared with relevant stakeholders before the country visit, in the form of an *aide memoire*.

Table 2. Evaluation questions

Themes	Evaluation questions
Relevance	1. To what extent did the project target and reach the poor and marginalised, and address the context-specific challenges around water equity in Tanzania? 2. How well did the project respond to the needs of target beneficiaries (primarily) and to the needs of the public institutions e.g. BWBs (secondarily), including how these needs evolved over time? 3. Was the project's gender approach relevant in encouraging the impacts and the sustainability of the project?
Effective-ness	4. What are the key drivers and barriers affecting the delivery of results for the project? In what way and why did these drivers and barriers affect delivery? 5. To what extent are the results that are reported a fair and accurate record of achievement? 6. According to key sector stakeholders, what has happened because of DFID funding that would otherwise not have happened?
Efficiency	7. To what extent did the grantee deliver results on time and on budget against agreed plans? 8. How well did the project apply value for money principles of effectiveness, economy and efficiency in relation to delivery of its outcome? How could these principles have been applied better? 9. Does the cost-per-beneficiary calculated by WWI appear realistic?
Sustainability	10. Which factors affected whether the benefits delivered by the project will be sustained after the project ends? 11. Which factors affect whether the project approach can be scaled up? 12. To what extent has the project leveraged additional resources (financial and in-kind) from other sources to continue or scale up activities?
Impact	13. To what extent and how has the project built the capacity of national and regional civil society, of water users and of BWBs to be able to better manage water resources? 14. To what extent and how has the project contributed directly to water security in Tanzania – and indirectly to equitable growth, climate resilience and Tanzania's wider Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda? 15. To what extent and how has the project affected people in ways that were not originally intended?
Learning	16. To what extent has the project used learning to improve delivery? 17. To what extent were lessons that emerged from the project shared with relevant stakeholders and the wider sector?

2.3 The evaluation approach

The evaluation was undertaken by OPM. The evaluation team comprised a national water sector specialist, Willie Mwaruvanda, and an evaluation specialist, Lucrezia Tincani. The report was quality assured by senior social development expert Andrew Kardan.

The evaluation was centred around a two-week country visit to Tanzania. The visit was preceded by an inception phase, during which the evaluation approach was designed and project documentation was reviewed. The visit was followed by an analysis of the information gathered.

Inception and methodology development (January 2016)

- During several inception meetings with key WWI staff, the broad approach of the evaluation and the **evaluation questions were reviewed**. The final list of the agreed evaluation questions is laid out in Section 2.2.
- Key documents relating to the project were reviewed, including case study reports from each project site, workshop reports and the logframe, with a summary of the latest monitoring data. These documents were used to draw up an initial **TOC**, which was iteratively revised during the country visit as a fuller understanding of the intended design was gained.
- The **evaluation methodology** was finalised and circulated to WWI in the form of an *aide memoire*, for comment. Semi-structured interview guides for each stakeholder were drawn up.
- The **field visit schedule** was agreed – including the selection of case studies to visit.

Activities during two-week country visit (February 2016)

- An initial meeting was held with Uhakika staff to gain an overview of the project's achievements and challenges, and to understand which stakeholders were involved in which activities (**stakeholder mapping).**
- Next, **four project sites were visited** in five days. During these visits the evaluation team interviewed Mashahidi, community members and members of local governments. These visits involved a mix of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and group evaluations[5]. In total, 46 community members were interviewed. Annex C lists the full list of interviewees.
- In each project site members of the relevant **staff from the agencies responsible for water management** (five staff from BWB and three from district technical staff) were also interviewed to obtain their perceptions of the project's work in their area. **Members from the BWB for all four river basins in which the project works** were interviewed over the phone or in person, alongside the **Director of Water Resources and the Director of NEMC.**
- During a two-day regional learning workshop in Morogoro, four staff from **partner CSOs** and two iNGOs were interviewed in relation to the lesson-sharing aspects of the project.
- In Dar es Salaam **key donors** (DFID, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), Donor Sector Group for water) were interviewed
- On the last day of the trip initial observations on the achievements of the projects and its key challenges were **discussed and validated with the PAC**.

Analysis and final evaluation report (March 2016)

Following analysis of the information gained on the trip, a write-up of the evaluation report was externally peer reviewed and circulated to WWI for comments.

Figure 3. Group evaluation undertaken in the project site at Mkindo

[5] Group evaluations involved sessions with 15–25 people, divided into four to five groups, each of which discussed specific questions relating to the successes, the challenges and the lessons from the project. The impressions were then validated across groups through a discussion, in order to obtain an idea of the consensus position across all participants.

2.4 Overview of the eight active project sites

Over the two-week country visit, four out of the eight active project sites were visited. These sites were selected so as to cover a range of different themes (see Table 3) and were chosen due to being within three hours' drive of the Morogoro project office, given the short time available to the evaluation team in-country. In order to gain an understanding of the experiences of the remaining four active project sites, case study reports and monitoring data were reviewed and some additional stakeholders were interviewed on the phone.

A map of the project sites is provided in Figure 11 in Annex C. As every project site is situated in a different context, an overview of the eight active project sites is given below. The project originally planned to implement activities across ten sites, but activities in two sites were put on hold pending additional funding under Phase II (see Section 3.5.1).

Table 3. Overview of themes covered by the ten project sites

The dots indicate the themes covered by each site. Green sites were visited during the evaluation.

		Applications for WUPs	Pollution control	Flood management and prevention	Efficacy of institutional arrangements and coordination of uses	Ground water quality	Adequacy of development safeguards[6]	Conflict over water
Wami/Ruvu Basin	Msimbazi		●	●				
	Ngerengere		●			●		
	Mkindo		●	●	●			Yes
	Mgeta				●			Yes
IDB Basin	Mbulu	●						
	Yaeda	●					●	Yes
Rufiji Basin	Kilombero	●			●		●	Yes
Pangani Basin	Upper Kikuletwa*				●			
	Lower Kikuletwa**				●			Yes
	Oldonyo*					●		

(*) Site was suspended for a year; (**) Site was suspended until March 2016, with work planned to restart under Phase II.

Ngerengere River in Morogoro (Wami-Ruvu Basin)

The Ngerengere River is severely polluted because of untreated discharges of industrial wastewater and municipal sewerage, especially from textile industries. This has heavily impacted riverine communities because the local groundwater is saline and so communities rely on the polluted river water. The APs reflect this and call on the government to respond. This case highlights how positioning by powerful industries, and the inadequate budgets and apparently overlapping responsibilities between the NEMC and the BWBs regarding pollution control can hinder the application of the law regarding river water quality. The project aimed to empower communities to

[6] For example Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and environmental flow assessments.

follow up on the pollution with the BWB, NEMC and the District Authority. It focused on three riverine communities which heavily depend on the river for domestic water supplies, livestock watering and irrigation.

Msimbazi River in Dar es Salaam (Wami-Ruvu Basin)

Dar es Salaam's main river, the Msimbazi, and its many tributaries are chronically and severely polluted by liquid and solid wastes[7]. It serves as an open sewer carrying a toxic mixture of industrial effluent, chemicals, carcinogens, abattoir waste and human sewage, resulting in a serious health risk – with high incidences of water-borne diseases, including cholera[8], along the river corridor. The river channel and flood plain have been modified and constructed upon, leading to increased risk of flooding. This urban case study is complex, as powerful industries, but also riverine populations, are polluting the river, and the affected population live in unplanned settlements, some of which have been marked for demolition. As with the Ngerengere case study, apparent regulatory overlap between NEMC and the BWB regarding pollution control, and inadequate budgets, have hindered progress. While the pollution in this urban case study is well known, the project aimed to highlight just how often riverine communities are exposed to these risks, and to highlight the inaction of the main polluter, NIDA Textiles, which has a functional water treatment facility but chooses not operate it to save running costs.

Mkindo WUA (Wami-Ruvu Basin)

The case study is conducted in partnership with iWASH (a USAID-funded project) to support communities who have suffered from both flooding (in the 1990s) and severe droughts (the last occurring in 2013) and fatalities during land conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in 2014. A Community Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA) methodology was developed and piloted in four villages. Uhakika's main aim in this case study was to strengthen the capacity of the WUA to be able to manage the community's climate coping strategy,[9] and to lead advocacy on water issues with the responsible government agencies. For this reason all of the Mashahidi recruited are members of the WUA.

Mgeta (Wami-Ruvu Basin)

This case study documents the water challenges facing farming communities along the Mgeta River, with some conflicts over water seen between upstream and downstream users. This case shows the challenges facing the 'frontline' institutions of water management and the limited budgets, which limit their ability to respond to community requests for assistance. Lack of information and awareness of WRM processes among farmers and officials has aggravated water resource depletion and degradation affecting almost 5,000 water users. The project used community mapping exercises to establish the need for an association, and this secured local demand for a WUA. The BWB was able to overcome funding constraints with co-financing from the Lions Club. This allowed the Wami-Ruvu BWB to establish a WUA to coordinate use, and to resolve existing and future water use conflicts.

[7] WWI 2016. Mzimbazi Case Study Bulletin.

[8] Wards along the river report high levels of water-borne disease and are hotspots for devastating cholera outbreaks (Ardhi University 2010 – cited in WWI 2016. Mzimbazi Case Study Bulletin).

[9] This was done by developing the CVCA tool so that the WUA could use it in all its villages to identify climate risks (including droughts and floods) and propose mitigation action plans in the form of a climate adaptation plan that would improve the climate resilience of WUA members.

Kilombero Valley (Rufiji Basin)

This case study explores the sustainable allocation of water and the efficacy of regulation via water WUPs in the Kilombero Valley, where there is rapid development of irrigation schemes alongside existing water use and environmental needs. It also examines the adequacy of safeguard measures for new water resource development, including EIAs and environmental flow assessment. The river serves fishing communities downstream, who have noted declining flows and fish stocks. The project's two aims in this case study were: (i) to highlight the current dysfunctionality of decision-making on water allocation, which fails to adequately consider downstream needs; and (ii) to assess how well the water use permitting procedure, monitoring and enforcement within the river catchment operates in regard to protecting the needs of water users and downstream interests. These aims were explored by helping several irrigation schemes and domestic water supply projects to secure permits, and by working with downstream fishing communities to explore how their needs are considered in decision-making. Of 16 ongoing irrigation schemes in the Kilombero Valley (in Kilombero District), only one had a WUP at baseline,[10] even though this permit is required by law prior to construction. Several new irrigation schemes are in the process of design and construction, including under the 'Big Results Now' government project (permits not applied for yet). Given the absence of a functional allocation and permitting regime this could lead to over-abstraction of water, environmental degradation and conflicts and tension over water allocation in future if the basin-wide IWRM plan is not implemented soon[11]. As a result the project has been working closely with the District Irrigation Officer (in joint selection of sites and joint field visits), who is responsible for providing support to the district's schemes. An environmental flow assessment is underway to support improved allocation processes and the project interacted with the assessment team and provided new information on downstream needs and the inadequacies of permitting processes[12]. Mashahidi are either members of irrigation schemes, domestic users or fisher folk.

Mbulu (Internal Drainage Basin)

This case study shows that BWBs are struggling to administer the WUP process because of a lack of resources and an overly bureaucratic system. This is directly undermining the water security of vulnerable communities. The project worked with six village communities of over 8, 000 people. Each community has applied for a WUP but none had been issued at project start. The case shows the need to improve the permitting system and to provide the BWBs with the resources they need to operate effectively.

Yaeda River (Internal Drainage Basin)

The Yaeda River in Mbulu showcases how poor WRM can cause conflict, have negative impacts on livelihoods and health, and undermine sustainable growth. The Yaeda Chini basin receives little rainfall and relies on the river to provide and replenish domestic water sources. Upstream of the project community, the IFAD-funded Mangisa Dam provides water for large irrigation schemes. The absence of an EIA, WUPs, allocation planning and any institutional management has led to over-abstraction upstream and water shortages downstream. This led to armed conflict in 2004. Alongside the generation of advocacy messages and materials to avoid similar scenarios elsewhere, the project

[10] WWI 2016. Kilombero Case Study Bulletin.

[11] The IWRM plan was begun by the government in 2010 but only finalised in 2015. The EFA was completed in February 2016 but the EIA and Social Impact Assessment have not yet been completed. The IWRM plan has not been implemented yet.

[12] The environmental flow assessment was completed in February 2016 but it only assessed the flow at five irrigation sites, not in the whole basin. At each site, the EFA assessed various aspects, including hydrology, hydraulic characteristics, riparian vegetation, geomorphology, fish diversity, invertebrates and community affairs. Flow recommendations were set for each site. While the detailed EFA did not focus on Uhakika's sites, the rapid EFA study carried out alongside the detailed EFA could provide useful insights. Results have not yet been released.

has initiated a review of how catchment-wide water allocations can be more equitably managed. The project also provided support for conflict resolution and towards the formation of a WUA.

Lower Kikuletwa (Pangani Basin)

This case study illustrates the unmet need for policy guidance on the use of diesel pumps for irrigation. The case is representative of many catchments across Tanzania, where the rapid increase in the use of diesel-powered pumps for small-scale irrigation is causing depletion, ecosystem degradation and conflict. Although diesel pump irrigation has significant livelihood benefits and is likely to be an efficient means of irrigation, regulation of these portable pumps to ensure sustainable use is very challenging. There is an absence of guidance or regulatory provision for how the BWBs or WUAs should manage this activity. The case study has led to WUPs being issued for portable pumps and new demand for clear policy and process guidance nationally.

2.5 Strengths and weaknesses of selected design and research methods

Given the limited budget for this evaluation and the short time in-country the evaluation used a qualitative approach, with active participation from project staff and stakeholders during the evaluation, building on existing monitoring data on outputs, outcomes and impacts. Key risks to the evaluation were alleviated through mitigating actions (see Table 4).

The strengths of the approach included being able to speak to a wide variety of project staff, community members, government counterparts, donors and CSOs, which allowed for triangulation between views. As there is always an element of subjective judgement when collating evidence, the report was quality assured by a senior evaluation specialist. Having a senior Tanzania sector specialist as part of the team also ensured that the findings were placed in the context of the national water sector.

With regard to understanding successes and challenges within case study communities, one weakness of the evaluation approach was only being able to carry out interviews in four out of the eight active project sites. Not being able to carry out interviews in Yaeda and with the fisher folk in Kilombero Valley, where more limited results have been achieved, was a limitation of the approach. Nonetheless, the available project reports provided useful insights into how well the programme operated across all sites visited, and enabled reliable inferences to be made regarding the programme as a whole.

With regard to national advocacy work, the evaluation was only able to speak to attendees of the fourth project workshop held, though project staff were asked about previous workshops and the experience of the JWSR meetings. The latter subject was also discussed with government counterparts and with two donors. The evaluation's theory-based approach was also constrained by the lack of a fully-articulated TOC against which to evaluate the programme, which may have resulted in some early misunderstandings regarding project design. The evaluation instead used the project's articulated objectives in its design documents, logframe and subsequent Annual Reports to draw up a TOC in consultation with project staff.

The evaluation team relied on the support of project staff in the selection of sites and in securing access to key stakeholders for interview. In some cases project staff were requested by the M&E team to assist through translation during community-level interviews. While this could have conceivably affected the independence of the evaluation, the evaluation team mitigated this by carrying out subsequent interviews without the presence of a project member, and by discussing community impacts with other government staff where possible. It was felt that carrying out the

evaluation as a joint initiative facilitated the successful conduct of the evaluation, allowed active learning by the project team throughout the evaluation, and enriched the debates and discussion with the evaluator.

Table 4. Mitigating actions taken to address evaluation limitations

Risk	Mitigating action
Key informants not available at the right time.	Followed up with BWB staff by telephone.
Unbalanced selection of stakeholders introduces bias.	Ensured stakeholder mapping took place early in the inception stage, and discussed key stakeholders for interview with several people outside WWI.
Fieldwork sites not a representative sample of areas of intervention.	Started site selection discussions with WWI early on, so as to understand what representativeness would mean in the context of Uhakika.
Stakeholders do not voice true opinions.	Allowed stakeholders to provide inputs anonymously if appropriate, and spoke to a sufficiently large group of people.
Project sites are too different to be able to draw generalisations across the programme; and the evaluation was only able to carry out interviews in four out of eight active sites.	The project team were interviewed with regard to the project sites that could not be visited during the evaluation, to ensure an overview of all sites was gained. Based on this overview, factors were explored that held across all sites.
Latest monitoring data not available to check latest progress and verify evidence provided.	Additional monitoring data were requested from the project team after the country visit.

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3 Findings

3.1 Overall results

The vast majority of logframe targets were achieved. Table 10 in Annex B.2 gives a quantitative overview of achieved results, in line with the indicators in the logframe. The data are based on monitoring data collected by the project as well as data from the Water Sector Status Report (WSSR) published annually by the MoWI[13]. The strengths of the monitoring systems which these results are based on, and the appropriateness of the logframe indicators, are discussed in Section 3.5.4.

The project has also achieved qualitative results beyond the logframe; these are explored in the rest of this section.

3.2 Relevance of the project approach

This section explores the relevance of the original project design within the context of the Tanzanian water sector. It also discusses the suitability of the overarching project approach, the suitability of the project partners chosen, and the suitability of the project sites chosen for achieving the project's objectives.

Box 1. Key findings on the relevance of project activities

- The project's concept is highly relevant to the Tanzanian water sector, which currently faces multiple challenges in delivering water security. Due to competing water demands and ineffective WRM, there is a risk that less powerful water users will receive less equitable access to, or legal protection of, the water resources they need for health, livelihoods and economic development.
- As a result, the choice of a SAM framework is an appropriate design for raising the voice and activating the rights of less powerful water users. This project's choice of focusing its community work on small community-level water users is highly relevant, as these have a weaker voice on water and face more severe impacts as a result of poor WRM.
- The project intended to raise the voice of these marginalised water users by increasing their capability to gather evidence on poor WRM, express their views and to demand their rights and entitlements, and thus to contribute to more equitable WRM. Project sites were selected that were well suited for such advocacy purposes. Insights gained through the community work intended to expose the root causes of poor performance within the sector. These insights, alongside participatory analysis of budget and staffing shortfalls undertaken by the project, were translated into advocacy messages for government, donors, civil society and the public, in order to bring about an improvement in sector performance.
- However, the project's ultimate aim of improving sector performance was ambitious given the project time-frame, as advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts.
- The project's partners were highly relevant in regard to the project's intention of having a constructive and collaborative approach with government. Staff from government institutions responsible for WRM (BWBs and NEMC) were directly involved in project implementation. Close sector engagement was also ensured by involving wider sector stakeholders through the PAC.

3.2.1 High relevance for the Tanzanian water sector

Clear importance for the sector

The importance of WRM to national social and economic development, and the sectoral importance of the issues which this project seeks to address, are very clear. The project's initial report on Tanzania's institutional WRM landscape in 2013 outlined how the government institutions responsible for WRM are intended to function. The report also highlighted gaps where policy is not

[13] It is important to note that the latest WSSR released in February 2016 relates to sector figures for 2014–2015, so the latest government monitoring data used to track progress on certain outcomes and impacts are not yet available.

implemented as intended, which were further clarified over the course of the project. For example, only a fraction of water users who should have a WUP actually possessed one in 2013, and only 18 discharge permits exists nationally, despite numerous wastewater discharges and widespread chronic pollution problems (Sanga *et al.* 2014; p.19). The BWBs regularly receive only 10% of the budgets needed to manage water resources effectively, none of the catchment committees have been set up and only a small proportion of the WUAs are active (ibid.).

> *In Tanzania there is a huge gap between policy and practice. Projects like these are needed to highlight how practice is being carried out, indicating where it does not match policies – but also highlighting where policies are impractical.* – NGO actor

Rapid water resource development for irrigated agriculture, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), energy and industry by the Tanzanian government through initiatives such as 'Big Results Now', Kilimo Kwanza and the SAGCOT initiative, are likely to put competing pressures on water resources. Achieving the government's commitment to increase irrigation coverage by two-thirds, and its SDG commitment of 100% of the Tanzanian population having access to safe drinking water by 2030[14] implies a huge increase in water resource exploitation. Without improved oversight and processes of public accountability for sector performance there is a real risk that water resources will face depletion, degradation, and contestation over user rights. It is likely that the poor communities lacking representation and voice will bear the brunt of these impacts, and that user rights and protections will not be equitably distributed, given these competing pressures by agriculture, industry and domestic users.

> *The sector urgently needs a social accountability voice, and placing that within a civil society organisation is ideal.* – Sector donor

Accountability within Tanzania's WRM sector is currently weak

Despite the significant investments made in the sector through the WSDP, performance and management systems remain weak within BWBs. This poses a challenge to their capacity to manage the rapidly increasing and competing water demands of irrigated agriculture, municipal supply and industry. Ineffective and inequitable WRM therefore poses a risk to Tanzania's sustainable economic growth, climate resilience and poverty reduction. Due to increasing and competing water demands, and ineffective and inequitable WRM, there is a risk that water users with a less powerful voice will receive less equitable access to, or legal protection of, the water resources they need for health, livelihoods and socio-economic development.

Given this context, it is highly relevant that Uhakika adopted a social accountability approach, with the aim of making BWBs and other responsible agencies more accountable and responsive to small community-level water users within their basins—particular poor and vulnerable communities. By generating insights into water challenges though case studies, to better understand barriers facing performance and opportunities for improved service delivery by responsible agencies, the project could contribute to increasing the visibility of, and political priority afforded to, the sub-sector, and could undertake advocacy work to contribute to systemic improvements in sector performance.

Given the weak voice on WRM within civil society, aiming to create an advocacy platform to raise this voice was highly relevant for the sector.

> *The CSO voice used to be very biased towards WASH. Now thanks to this project there is more voice on WRM*. – Director of Water Resources within MoWI

[14] SDG 6.1 entails achieving universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all.

Well aligned with other sector initiatives

The project's focus on social accountability was inspired by social accountability work in the education and health sectors in Tanzania, which have over the past decade used citizen agency and a 'whistle blower' approach to highlight weaknesses in sector delivery. Citizen engagement and budget tracking is being used by other NGOs, such as WaterAid, Twaweza, Daraja and Policy Forum, to monitor the reliability of the water supply, but this project appears to be the first example of applying SAM in a systematic way to WRM in Tanzania – and to our knowledge internationally. WWF is using multi-stakeholder platforms to foster dialogue and social learning between different water users, but this does not involve a SAM or advocacy component[15].

In order to ensure that the project's design and activities are aligned with other sector initiatives, and to ensure that communication, collaboration and learning uptake were maximised, the project included key sectoral donors and NGOs on its PAC. The project also shared its insights with wider stakeholders at the Technical Working Group (TWG) on water, to ensure these insights were shared within the sector. The NGOs *Policy Forum, Tanzania Natural Resource Forum* and *Twaweza* were also consulted during the initial project design, and they later advised the project team on the budget analysis and advocacy work.

3.2.2 Choice of project design

The project was designed to increase accountability in the water sector, by strengthening voices of both community-level water users and CSOs on WRM issues.

The project had the dual aim of bringing about improvements in water security in the communities where it operated, as well as acting at as a catalyst for improved performance in the Tanzanian water sector, through its advocacy work. To achieve this, it tested an SAM approach. SAM is defined as '*civic engagement, in which ordinary citizens and civil society organizations participate in exacting accountability through a proactive process of institutional performance monitoring and open deliberation in the public domain*' (Fox 2014). Testing this approach systematically in Tanzania made it possible to explore its value to the water sector there and elsewhere. As the first approach of its kind on WRM, monitoring, evaluation and local and international learning were prioritised.

To achieve this aim, the project operated at several levels: at community level, the project aimed to raise the voice of marginalised water users by increasing their capacity to collect evidence, understand the law, express their views and to demand their rights and entitlements, and thus contribute to a more equitable WRM. Powerlessness, including the inability of individuals to express their views or to have them heard, is an integral part of poverty and marginalisation (Brown *et al.* 2008). Communities and project staff then documented whether duty bearers are 'answerable' for their actions by documenting the extent to which government authorities were responsive to the voices and requests of these community-level users.

The project deliberately focused on small-scale community-level users who are more likely to be excluded in the context of competing water because of their much greater vulnerability to water-related problems when compared to more powerful water users, such as private sector companies that are also dependent on water resources. Direct engagement with the private sector was not a key feature of this project, because the intention was to test how well government institutions are able to hold the private sector to account via regulatory process. The private sector was represented within the PAC (via Olam) and private sector stakeholders at case studies were engaged at the end of Phase I through letters sharing the evidence, demanding a response, and calling for meetings with affected communities. Phase II will strengthen the project's engagement with private sector.

[15] Following the project workshop in February 2016 WWF is, however, considering incorporating SAM into its approach.

The project was designed in such a way that if the government was responsive to the demands of small-scale community-level users, this would improve water security for project communities in the immediate future. If not, the project could use their lack of response – a social audit of government performance – as an evidence base for advocacy work. Documenting these responses was intended to provide insights into both explicit and 'tacit constraints' facing the WRM sector (Hepworth 2009), and to expose root causes of poor performance so that constructive solutions could be put in place. This is an important element for turning the insights gained from the project's community work into effective advocacy messages and recommendations for the sector.

> *The beauty of [the project approach] is that even where government response to this 'water security activation' is weak or non-existent, this information can be used productively to improve the WRM system. By carefully documenting the duty bearer response and reasons for a lack of action, the project forms a social audit of government performance, generating evidence for where bottlenecks in delivery need to be addressed.* – Hepworth *et al.* 2016

Insights from community work were combined with insights from a participatory analysis of budget and staffing shortfalls undertaken by the project. At national level, the project translated these insights into evidence-based advocacy[16] messages that had the intention of highlighting key bottlenecks within the sector, which were shared with government, donors, civil society and the public through various advocacy channels. Advocacy messages included 'recommendations for action by the public, policymakers and practitioners' (Hepworth *et al.* 2016) in order to bring about an improvement in sector performance. Making the agencies responsible for WRM more accountable and responsive to citizens can contribute to improving the equity of water resource distribution, and improving the security of water resource access in future.

The project was successful in taking a fresh approach to improving sector performance:

> *Instead of trying to supply more capacity [for BWBs], [the project] takes a fresh approach by helping communities demand improved performance from 'duty bearers' on WRM, and to raise the profile of WRM so that it receives the attention, political support and funding it needs.* – Hepworth *et al.* 2016

The project's approach to bringing about an improvement in sector performance through project activities relied on two key assumptions, which are set out in the project documentation: firstly, it is assumed that institutions are able to respond to applications for recognition and protection of legal water rights (AR 2015). As a result of this assumption the project did not engage in direct capacity-building work with government institutions. Such work is already being carried out by other donors. Secondly, it is assumed that the project's constructive advocacy messages are well received by government and that recommendations are taken on board in order to strengthen sector performance (see quote below). The latter expectation required that the project worked with civil servants and officials in the relevant government departments to ensure they were able to effectively engage with the feedback received from project communities in a meaningful way – and to deliver supply side accountability. The assumption made by the project design was that this also required engagement with government as partners in the project, to ensure they had a sense of shared ownership of the project (project partners are discussed in Section 3.2.3).

> *The programme design was partially predicated on the assumption that 'speaking truth to power' can drive change.* – Hepworth *et al.* 2016

[16] The project defines evidence-based advocacy as 'advocacy that aims to influence decisions within political, economic, and social systems and institutions and can include many activities including media campaigns, public speaking, publishing research or briefings and lobbying decision makers. Evidence-based advocacy means using well-researched, relevant and reliable information to support and illustrate recommendations and messages in order to encourage a positive response" (Hepworth *et al.* 2016).

The project aim of improving sector performance was ambitious given the project time-frame

With examples of other social accountability programmes in Tanzania operating on a five to ten year time-frame[17], the 2.5 year time-frame dictated by the GPAF funding conditions was ambitious in terms of the goal of improving sector effectiveness through SAM. Advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts. However, documenting the responses of responsible agencies to requests from community-level users and developing advocacy materials based on this, and sharing learning generated, was clearly feasible within the project time-frame.

3.2.3 Intentional involvement of government counterparts as project partners

Project partners were involved in direct implementation and in an advisory function

The implementation of project activities was done through project staff and the core team seconded to the project. A wider set of stakeholders were also involved, in an advisory function, through the PAC. These included key government stakeholders, NGOs, donors, local civil society networks, universities and private sector organisations (e.g. Olam).

Figure 4. Project organogram*



(*) Grey: Advisory partners. Blue: Salaried project staff. Green: Core team members seconded to the project from civil society and government partners.

Main responsible government agencies directly involved in the project

The project's partners were highly relevant to the project's intention of having a constructive and collaborative approach with government. The project was set up to involve the two primary bodies responsible for WRM according to Tanzanian law: the BWB (decentralised units of the MoWI) and the NEMC (the enforcement arm of the Division of Environment, within the Vice President's Office)[18].

[17] Comment made by an NGO working on social accountability in the Tanzania education sector (Morogoro Workshop attendant)

[18] The Division of Environment itself was not directly involved, even though it supervises the EIAs needed for large water infrastructure projects.

These bodies were involved at two levels: one senior staff member from each body was invited to join the PAC, and less senior members of staff from each body were asked to be seconded[19] to the project so they could participate as core team members in the initial water security mapping exercise and in community activities. The former role was intended to allow the government bodies to be well-informed of the project's plans, and to create a shared sense of ownership through annual PAC meetings. The latter role was intended to raise the awareness on the part of government staff regarding the negative impacts of poor WRM on communities, to allow them to be part of resolving these issues, and to then feed back on progress to their superiors. Both processes were intended to instil a sense of shared ownership by the government over the project.

In addition to the BWBs and NEMC, the project also ended up working closely with other relevant members of local government, including the District Irrigation Engineers, District Water Engineers, District Fisheries Officers, Ward Health Workers, and Village Executive Officers.

WUAs involved in a few cases

WUAs are community-level structures that cover several villages. They are also the lowest decentralised structure of the IWRM framework. WUAs have responsibility for monitoring performance, helping to resolve conflicts, and coordinating water uses and users. As such, they appear to be ideally placed to participate in a project like Uhakika. However, the project did not include WUAs as a formal project partner as very few areas in Tanzania have functional WUAs. The project deliberately intended to test the responsiveness of water institutions (including WUAs) and the ability of communities to hold them to account *within the status quo,* regardless of how (dys)functional these are, in order to signpost priorities for improvement. Setting up WUAs and strengthening them was not feasible within the short project timeline as it would have required additional financial resources, and would also have provided an unrepresentative picture of the institutional setting faced by most water users. As a result, the project worked through WUAs in two out of eight active project sites where this set-up was appropriate and where additional funds could be secured. Work with WUAs in these sites allowed the project to explore how well WUAs were being supported by the BWBs.

3.2.4 Project sites primarily selected based on their potential for advocacy work

This project focuses on four of Tanzania's most contested and populous river basins – the Wami-Ruvu, IDB, Pangani and Rufiji – where there is rapidly increasing demand, including for Tanzania's largest cities, the majority of its industry and commercial and subsistence agriculture[20]. The project used a 'Water Security Scan' to choose which thematic water issues and which geographical areas to focus on within those four basins. This was based on an extensive literature review, consultation exercise and field scoping[21] and is cited as one of the innovative elements of the project (AR 2015). The 'Water Security Scan' report clearly highlighted the impact of weak implementation of water resource policy on communities and set out the selection criteria for the project sites.

It is important to understand that the project intended to focus on those communities with a high livelihood reliance on water, which are not necessarily the poorest communities even though they may include users with little voice in regard to their water rights. This choice makes sense in the context of an advocacy rather than a development project. The potential of the site for advocacy was a key criterion. For example, sites with highly visible issues were given preference, and areas with

[19] Secondment was arranged on the basis of an agreement that the person would seek to be available for occasional community activities when requested: they would remain full-time salaried government staff, but the project would cover their expenses and per diems in the field, in line with government policy on per diems.
[20] WWI 2013. Uhakika project proposal.
[21] This involved joint field site visits with BWB staff, issue mapping at two consultative workshops, an email questionnaire completed by 24 water sector organisations and a review of the available MoWI reports and IWRM plans.

links to important national projects, such as the 'Big Results Now' initiative, were preferred. Sites were also matched to the regional expertise of the team to ensure that the advocacy work could build on existing relationships with the government agencies. To avoid duplication, areas where other donors were already active were excluded,[22] as well as locations that were too remote[23].

The project aimed to include issues that were of most pressing concern and the most common WRM risks. In practice, the ten project sites selected covered a variety of different issues where there was potential for high impact[24]: namely, sites relating to WUPs, sites affected by pollution, sites exposed to flooding, sites affected by ground water quality and sites with issues relating to the institutional challenges of coordinating upstream and downstream water users. Final project sites included both those with quick wins (e.g. relating to WUP applications) and those that were complex cases (e.g. those requiring strengthening of WUAs), to allow a continuous flow of evidence which can be used for advocacy.

The final site selection had an unintentional bias towards rural rather than urban sites, and a bias towards surface water rather than groundwater. Arguably, issues around illegal groundwater abstraction affect a far larger share of the population than those that are affected by pollution or competition over surface water. However the project justifies its focus in this area as other organisations such as WaterAid and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) already engage with the pressing groundwater challenges facing Dar es Salaam in particular.

The non-representative nature of the project sites could, however, have implications for the credibility of the advocacy messages, as there is a risk that messages are perceived as highlighting the worst cases. Following a recommendation by the PAC, the project explored the option of including successful examples of WRM policy implementation, but examples of such cases could not be obtained from the MoWI. Nonetheless, the focus on challenging, rather than successful, case studies has allowed the project to highlight bottlenecks in the ability of the government to deal with water issues:

> *Water security is a difficult concept to explain. People will not understand what it is until there is a problem. That is why this project tried to provide evidence to the public and to duty bearers, showing that if they don't act now there will be no future for their children*. – Core project staff member

[22] E.g. Some NGOs already work on pollution by mining companies (though pollution by small-scale artisanal mining is less well documented); WWF is active in the Great Ruaha Valley, where there are significant issues with WUP issuance; and JICA has a project on urban boreholes in Dar, where there are significant water quality issues..

[23] From the final selection of sites it is evident that proximity to the project office in Morogoro was also a key criterion – as expected for a small project with a limited budget for transport costs. The reasons for having the project office in Morogoro and not elsewhere in Tanzania were not inquired into.

[24] The logframe objective of reaching a certain number of beneficiaries favoured the selection of sites where project activities could potentially benefit at least 25,000 people per site.

3.3 Effectiveness and impact of community-level activities

This section explores the effectiveness and impact of the project's community-level activities and is structured in line with the TOC constructed for the purpose of this evaluation. Key findings are summarised in the box below. The effectiveness of community-level activities relates firstly to the degree to which the project increased the capacity of its focal people in communities – the *Mashahidi wa maji*; Kiswahili for "water witnesses" – to demand their rights, and the degree to which the Mashahidi were willing and able to implement agreed APs and test the responsiveness of the BWB to resolving water issues. Secondly, effectiveness relates to the degree to which the Mashahidi's actions led to a positive response by the government, which was intended to have a positive impact on the community's water security[25]. A summary of the outputs and outcomes achieved at each project site is presented in Table 5.

The intended impact of community-level activities relates to their success in generating insights which could form the basis of advocacy work at national level – this is discussed in the context of the effectiveness of the advocacy messages themselves (Section 3.4.1).

Box 2. Key findings on the effectiveness and impact of community-level activities

- **Community activities were successfully completed across eight sites**. Activities in the two remaining sites were suspended until Phase II. Given the novelty of applying SAM approaches to the water sector in Tanzania, **iterative lesson-learning and adjustment by the project team was key**, and took place based on feedback from communities and project staff.
- **The participatory action research approach chosen with communities was highly effective in raising the awareness needed among Mashahidi to get the APs implemented.** Mashahidi expressed an improved capacity to express their views and demand their rights.
- **While some agreed APs took longer to be implemented, the majority (87%) were implemented across eight project sites by project end**. The tight time-frame, limited funds and limited staffing of the project posed minor challenges for the implementation of community-level work. Some Mashahidi reported that more frequent visits by project staff would have allowed APs to be implemented more quickly, and would have improved and maintained their motivation. The budget allowed most project sites to be visited three to four times during the three-year project.
- Achieving positive impacts for the water security of affected communities was an ambitious objective within the three-year time-frame. Nonetheless, the project contributed to positive impacts in many communities. Positive impacts were more likely where the response to an AP was more within the control of the project or community, or where the solutions were within relatively easy reach of responsible authorities. **Overall, the project directly contributed towards increased water security for 159,000 people**. In the two project sites where WUPs were secured, communities felt that thanks to having a more secure water supply they were able to have more reliable agricultural yields. One irrigation scheme was able to use their WUP as collateral to secure a financial loan. However, the unintended water security improvements achieved thanks to awareness-raising by Mashahidi may not be sustained as there is a risk that communities may resume waste dumping in rivers, and may not continue flood-protection measures for their agricultural fields.
- **A key challenge was securing a favourable response from relevant government authorities on WUP application and on pollution control within the project time-frame**. Twelve out of 18 WUP applications (relating to two project sites) and one out of three sites saw enforcement action on pollution by responsible authorities.
- **It was challenging to manage expectations at community level in some project sites, where the project was not able to facilitate a resolution to their water issues within the project time-frame.** Some Mashahidi who did not receive a favourable response to their AP request intended to pursue a more confrontational approach. In two sites affected by pollution, Mashahidi for example intended to contact the media. Confrontational approaches could jeopardising the project's constructive advocacy approach with the government but so far **no evidence of negative impacts was found**, such as reprisals as a result of advocacy work.

[25] While some Mashahidi also raised awareness of water issues in their area, which contributed to raising the profile of WRM and the BWB's work more widely, this was not an explicitly intended role for the Mashahidi and will be covered under sustainability (Section 3.6.1).

Table 5. Summary of outputs and outcomes achieved

Project sites		APs implemented	Outputs achieved	Outcomes achieved
Wami/ Ruvu Basin	Msimbazi	Five out of six implemented	Awareness of the negative impacts of solid waste dumping raised by Mashahidi within the community	Improved water quality due to reduced dumping of solid waste (No change in pollution levels)
	Ngerengere	100%	Responsible agency took notice of complaint letter by Mashahidi	Process underway for construction of new water treatment facility***
	Mkindo	100%	Awareness of risk of cultivating on the flood plain raised by Mashahidi within the community[26]	Reduction in exposure to flooding risks through implementation of climate coping plans (No change in pollution levels)
	Mgeta	100%	The project generated interest in, and facilitated the creation of, a WUA	New WUA established
IDB Basin	Mbulu	100%	Mashahidi applied for, and were issued with, new WUPs	More secure water supply through WUPs being issued
	Yaeda	One out of two implemented	(WUP not yet applied for)	No change yet – WUP still pending; WUA not yet established
Rufiji Basin	Kilombero	Five out of six implemented	Mashahidi applied for, and were issued with, new WUPs	More secure water supply through WUPs being issued
		One out of four implemented	n/a	No change yet – though the EFA may result in fisher folk's water needs being taken into account in future
Pangani Basin	Upper Kikuletwa*	100%	The project assisted the WUA to regulate use of diesel pumps	Increased likelihood of more equitable water supply in future, through regulation of diesel pumps by WUA
	Lower Kikuletwa**	0%	n/a	n/a
	Oldonyo**	0%	n/a	n/a

(*) Site was suspended for a year. (**) Site was suspended for two years, with work planned to restart under Phase II. (***) This outcome was facilitated by external factors.

3.3.1 Implementation of community-level APs

Participatory action research was appropriate for gaining a balanced overview of water issues

The project used participatory action research to select the appropriate water issue to focus on in each project site, in line with local priorities. The water issues were scoped as a result of an initial

[26] Those whose fields were flooded in last years have moved their crops to higher grounds. This year fewer crops have been affected by floods. We have also dug channels on our fields to help divert the flood water. This has protected our crops, none were damaged so far [this rainy season]. – Mashahidi, Mkindo.

community visit – part of the 'Water Security Scan' – and through subsequent visits, following the selection of the final project sites. During the case study visits a variety of participatory approaches were used, including: interviews and consultation with local informants, government officials or structures[27]; joint site inspections; and community time-lines, issue ranking and participatory mapping with community groups ranging from three to 38 community members. Investigations and discussions focused both on the nature and severity of water insecurity issues faced, as well as the historical context and the extent of the community group most seriously affected. Secondary data and interviews with local experts were also drawn on. The size of the population facing water insecurity at each case study site was established and checked through several means (local information from several sources, local government statistics, census data and household counts) and this then formed the basis for establishing baseline data on potential beneficiaries of the project at outcome level[28].

The participatory mapping and analyses of water issues was appropriate for obtaining an overview and more detailed and reliable information of water issues faced, with triangulation between different views. It was also highly effective in regard to transferring the necessary knowledge and awareness needed for implementation of the agreed APs (see below) – a process referred to by the project as community activation.

> *First mapping of issues at community level is a key step to ensure that the project tackles the issues which the people themselves feel strongly about. Many social accountability projects just pick a topic which has wider relevance but which may not be foremost on people's minds in that area. As a result, people end up using social accountability to complain about other things.* – Workshop attendee

Improved capacity of Mashahidi to express their views and demand their rights

The project used Mashahidi as the anchor of their activities at community-level. Out of the 84 people who volunteered to act as Mashahidi, the project pursued work with 37 Mashahidi across eight project sites. Activities in two sites were put on hold pending additional funding under Phase II (see Section 3.5.1). Mashahidi implemented a range of community-level activities, agreed in the form of Mashahidi APs, in order to contact relevant authorities about their water issues, demand a response, and to raise awareness about water issues in their community. The use of Mashahidi as an anchoring point is cited as one of the innovative elements of the project (AR 2015). The idea came from social accountability work in the education sector in Tanzania, which also supported interested and active community members in a citizen agency approach.

All interviewed Mashahidi clearly stated that, thanks to the project, they had gained a better awareness of the water-related risks they faced and of which areas were most affected. They also gained a better understanding of water policies and the responsibilities of institutions—including how to apply for a WUP and who to contact within the relevant authorities.

As a result this, interviewed Mashahidi felt that the project directly contributed to helping their views be better expressed and better heard. In some cases community members explained that previously they had expressed their concerns verbally to local government officers, which had resulted in no response. Expressing these concerns in writing, backed up with a clear understanding of the duties of responsible institutions, was the reason why Mashahidi felt their views were better heard.

[27] Entry points varied depending on the contexts, and included district irrigation or water engineers, WASHCOM, ward health extension officers or ward agriculture extension officers, schools, churches or local government.

[28] While the project sites undoubtedly included poor urban and rural people, the intention was not to explicitly target the most poor or vulnerable communities in each basin. For example, some of the irrigation associations included as beneficiaries are not amongst the very poorest – however, they have a livelihood that is highly dependent on water and clearly explained how the insecurity in regard to water access is impacting their livelihood.

> *Before Uhakika we were complaining every day but government didn't respond. We used to use our representatives at ward level and got no response. Before we weren't using letters, just verbal and informal complaints. […] The community used to know nothing of the law. We've made government aware that we know our rights in law and they have come to take action that they didn't before. We are delighted. When the government knew that we knew our rights – that is why they responded to our complaints.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere site

The majority of APs were implemented

The project team agreed a series of APs[29] with each Mashahidi and the community, which set out the steps each party would take to resolve the water security challenge at hand – for example contacting local authorities, applying for WUPs, or carrying out other activities in order to protect or secure their right to a water source. While some agreed APs took longer to be implemented, the majority (87%[30]) were implemented in the eight active project sites by project end. This suggests the project's approach of explaining water rights and regulations, and supporting Mashahidi to activate their rights, was effective.

Table 6 outlines insights from a small sample of interviewed Mashahidi on which key factors affected the implementation of APs. The majority are external factors, which were largely beyond the control of the project. In contrast, regularity of support from the project team was cited as a key factor affecting how quickly AP were implemented, as regular support allowed the project team to support Mashahidi by adapting to their specific situation.

Inevitably, the motivation of Mashahidi also played a role in whether issues were pursued persistently enough to elicit a response. Piloting of the Mashahidi approach in a site with pollution from a textile factory highlighted the importance of motivation by Mashahidi[31]. While in one community the Mashahidi did not fully understand their role, this appeared to be an isolated case[32]. The quotes below illustrate the different motivations of Mashahidi. Due to their central role within the project, which Mashahidi volunteered for the role played a key part in the efficiency and effectiveness of project activities. As most Mashahidi were nominated by the community to represent them, it was important for the project to understand their interest, motivation and capacity, to ensure that none were participating simply out of protocol.

> *We became Mashahidi because we were facing many problems with pollution. The Uhakika team increased our awareness about what we could do about it.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere

> *I am the secretary of this [irrigation] scheme. We have tried to apply for a WUP for a long time [five years] but have not succeeded. So I was very interested to learn [how to apply] and now I am sharing [what I learned] as I know how much it helps.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

Some of the nominated Mashahidi were members of local-level institutions – either the WASH committee, the environment committee, the village executive council (VEC), the local school or the WUA (if present). Those who were not part of other community or government structures were often

[29] AP were made up of a list of agreed activities to be carried out by the Mashahidi, including writing letters to a relevant authority, applying for a WUP, monitoring water quality or calling a meeting with water users.

[30] This figure relates to the 47 actions planned in the eight active project sites. An additional eight actions were planned in areas that were later suspended until Phase II.

[31] In a site near the Karibu textiles factory on Kizinga River (Wami/Ruvu Basin), community members were only interested to become Mashahidi if they were paid an allowance. Intrinsic motivation may have been low because the original riverside inhabitants had been relocated and the new population did not remember how clean the river was before pollution began, and were therefore less interested in efforts to reduce pollution.

[32] While a written summary of the roles and responsibilities of Mashahidi and of project staff was shared with Mashahidi at project start, the project team decided against signing a formal memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each Mashahidi as it would have been perceived as overly contractual. Nonetheless, in one site they report: *It was decided together that we, the chairperson and secretary of the scheme, would be the most appropriate people to be the Mashahidi. The education role of Mashahidi is not very clear to us. We are just continuing our same job [on the scheme committee] as before*. – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

respected members of the community. This suggests that an individual's standing within the community may be key. Mashahidi interviewed by the evaluation team felt that their position gave them the authority and confidence to speak about water issues on behalf of others. While in some cases the Mashahidi were also part of local government structures, no evidence was seen that this made them less willing to speak out and criticise responsible government agencies. Conversely, project staff reported that some government staff well placed to act as Mashahidi were not willing to formally sign up for the role. This tended to be government staff at district level rather than elected representatives at ward or village level.

> *It is helpful that I am part of the village government. I represent a wider group of people. It makes it more likely that they will listen to our complaints.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere

> *I am a member of the VEC so people tell me about how they suffer [from the polluted river].I feel their pain. People have to pay 500/bucket for clean water from the water sellers; it is even more unaffordable in the dry season. Now [as Mashahidi] I can speak for them and get in touch with the industry.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere site

Table 6. Factors influencing the implementation of APs

	Success factor	Challenge
Motivation	Favouring Mashahidi who had an intrinsic motivation to address water issues: the project used the lack of financial incentives as a means of filtering out those Mashahidi who lacked intrinsic motivation.	While a risk assessment was carried out for each AP, to ensure it would not put the Mashahidi at risk[33], a better understanding of the Mashahidi's motivations and capacity to implement the AP could have increased the effectiveness of this process. In one site, the community group from which some Mashahidi stemmed did not appear to have enough organisational capacity to implement APs[34], though the evaluation team could not verify this information as this site was not visited.
Knowledge / awareness	Any APs requiring technical knowledge (e.g. application for a WUP) were implemented with support from the project staff[35]. Where lack of knowledge affected attitudes and willingness to implement AP, the project addressed this in its initial scoping visit[36].	In some sites, the quality of the initial awareness gained may have been limited by the project team's own level of understanding of WRM legislation[37]. Level of knowledge was not a key constraint on the implementation of APs, but did constrain the degree of knowledge-sharing by Mashahidi (see Section 3.6.1).
Financial capacity	The project covered minor costs associated with implementing the APs, once it became clear that not all the Mashahidi could afford these (AR	Financial ability to cover the cost of application fees and user fees was a barrier in one domestic WUP in Mbulu and Yaeda, where users found the fees unaffordable.

[33] E.g. health risk from exposure to heavily polluted water, personal/reputational risk from exposing a water issue to the local government, etc.

[34] '*The project chose Mashahidi who were part of CHAWAKI, but that association is based far away, here in town, and they are not strong – their leaders are old and are not interested in advocacy. They lack funds to sustain their activities. The project should have worked through the three Beach Management Units (BMUs) that were set up here in 2014; they are based right at the river*.' – District fisheries officer (CHAWAKI is a fisheries association that was set up in 2013, as part of the 2012 Fisheries Act. They registered themselves at the district office, without external funding support. The BMUs are a community-based organisation of fisher folk who educate their community on how to protect the river and its fisheries. They were set up under the RAMSAR convention, with British Council Funding).

[35] E.g. for the schemes applying for a WUP in Mkula the project brought in the District Irrigation Engineer (DIE) to help the community fill out the application forms.

[36] 'At first we did not see why we should pay for water in Kilombero. We have always irrigated here, why do we suddenly need permits to do so? Then the project explained to us the benefits of having a permit.' – Community member, Kilombero site

[37] Some instances were observed where staff and Mashahidi had an incomplete understanding of WRM policies.

	2015). This included postage fees and transport costs to and from the BWB. Financial ability to cover the cost of application fees and user fees was not cited as a barrier to application for WUPs by irrigators, as fees are nationally subsidised by the government[38].	
Regularity of project engagement	The project deliberately purchased an off-road vehicle capable of reaching remote areas. Most sites were visited three to four times during the project. Regular contact was maintained by mobile phone.	High transport costs and budgetary constraints affected the capacity to regularly visit remote communities, where contact was also limited by poor network coverage[39]. Interviewed communities mentioned that irregular visits from the project team affected how quickly APs were implemented.

A number of APs have not been implemented. In the case of some of these this is reportedly due to inactiveness of Mashahidi (see Table 11 in Annex B). However the evaluation team did not visit these communities and is therefore unable to verify the reasons for lack of implementation. One project team member mentioned that the perceived lack of urgency of the water issue targeted by the project may have been one reason for slow implementation in Yaeda and Kilama, but this could not be further explored as those sites were not visited by the evaluation team. Almost by definition, the nine out of 37 Mashahidi[40] who became less active over the project lifecycle were difficult to reach to organise an interview in which their views could be further explored.

Figure 5. Group photo of Mashahidi and project staff during the evaluation exercise, near the Msimbazi project site

[38] Annual fees for an average irrigation scheme in the Kilombero Valley cost 250,000 Tanzania Shilling (TZS)/year and such a scheme serves roughly 300 members. This amounts to an annual user fee of TZS 1000/person/year (£3.00). Irrigation schemes are generally well organised and have a finance officer who collects contributions from members.

[39] Poor mobile network meant that communication with the fishermen in Kilombero was irregular due to poor mobile network and the project site was only visited once due to the inaccessibility of the site.

[40] ten Ten Mashahidi became less active over the project, but one of these was the ward officer to Ngeregere, who moved jobs.

The gender of Mashahidi had little consequence for effectiveness

The project recruited slightly fewer female than male Mashahidi (1:1.4 ratio), because the degree to which women volunteered was lower for cultural reasons. However, both communities and project staff felt this had little consequence for the effectiveness of activities carried out. While it is possible that women could be more effective at awareness-raising because they have a better overview of community concerns regarding water, interviewed community members did not feel this was an important factor. They felt that aiming for an equal gender split seemed to be the most effective option for ensuring APs were implemented.

> *The gender of the Mashahidi does not matter. However, it is better not to choose a member of the irrigation committee as she is already so busy that she ended up rarely updating us on the progress [of the WUP application]* – Community member, Kilombero

> *In Africa if you teach a woman, you teach a community. The project has tried its level best to involve women. Many Mashahidi are women but it should not target only women. We need a mix of women and men.* – Core project staff member (BWB)

3.3.2 Improvements in the water security of project communities

The project intended to contribute to an incremental improvement in water security in its project sites. Water security levels are, however, difficult to measure, as no universal metric exists. The project intended to use social testimonies, observations by the project team, water quality spot measurements and the existence of legal action/WUPs to demonstrate impacts on water security. A more robust quantitative impact assessment, including systematic water quality testing, was not feasible within the tight project budget. These impact measures were still being systematically recorded at the time of the evaluation. The evaluation team explored impacts in the project sites visited, and requested information for the remainder of the sites from the project team. The causal links between project activities, outcomes and impacts for each project site are summarised in Annex B.2.

Despite the short project time-frame, activities led to tangible benefits in most of the communities – a major achievement – though in some sites external factors significantly contributed to these beneficial impacts (see below). Project activities contributed to a more secure water supply thanks to WUPs being issued, improved water quality in rivers due to awareness-raising by Mashahidi, reduced exposure to flooding, and more equitable WRM through the strengthening of WUAs.

Where the response to an AP was more within the control of the project, clear benefits for water security were seen

The project was successful in contributing to an incremental improvement in water security in those project sites where the desired response to the AP was more within the control of the project and of the Mashahidi themselves. This was the case, for example, for those sites where project activities directly led to the strengthening of a WUA, which was thus able to better manage competing water uses.

Some unexpected benefits seen thanks to initiatives taken by Mashahidi

Some unexpected water security benefits were seen thanks to initiatives taken by Mashahidi themselves. The evaluation team observed such cases in Msimbazi and Mkindo – where positive impacts were brought about directly as a result of the awareness-raising done by Mashahidi. It should be noted that the TOC predicted that securing a positive response from responsible government agencies would bring about positive changes for the communities' water security status, rather than actions by the Mashahidi themselves.

> *People know from the radio that they should not eat these vegetables [grown with polluted river water] but they never really paid attention. Now [as Mashahidi] we went door to door and they have realised how bad it is for them and have stopped eating them.* – Mashahidi, Msimbazi site

Likelihood of permit issuance or pollution control influenced by political economy factors

In some sites, less success was seen where the desired response to an AP depended on a favourable response by responsible government agencies. The evidence clearly shows that in the sites involving WUP applications the project played a key role in helping communities to apply for or follow up on previous WUP applications. Similarly, in the project sites involving pollution, the communities clearly stated that they contacted relevant authorities thanks to the efforts of the project.

> *Before the project came here we had been trying for five years to get a WUP. Twice we went back to the BWB because we had filled out the wrong form; it cost us time and money. Now we know who to ask about our permit['s progress]. The project also covered our transport to the sub-basin office[41] and continued to encourage us.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site. [Received permit in December 2015]

> *The project explained to us the benefits of a WUP and how to protect our water sources. They explained to us how to apply for a WUP. Maybe we could have applied alone but the speed was much faster thanks to the project.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

However, in both cases actually securing WUPs or achieving enforcement action on pollution was strongly affected by external factors outside of the project's control. Both cases are discussed below.

Clear benefits for water security and income security where WUPs have been secured

Of the 18 WUP applied for, 12 were secured by February 2016. Delays during the project were largely a result of the capacity of BWBs in regard to processing applications, with no evidence found for any deliberate unwillingness to engage with Mashahidi[42]. Several BWB reported only having funds to hold a board meeting (in which applications were reviewed) once a year – as opposed to quarterly– with the comments on applications requested from district offices reported to cause further delays. In addition, the absence of a streamlined process for reviewing small-scale WUP applications meant that these underwent the same rigorous screening as larger commercial WUP applications.

Nonetheless, once WUPs were secured, interviewed communities felt that thanks to having a more secure water supply they were able to obtain more reliable yields. One irrigation scheme was able to use their WUP as collateral to secure a financial loan. All interviewed communities felt that this improvement in livelihoods was a direct result of the WUP which the project helped them apply for. This was the case for communities who were issued a WUP by project end, as well as those whose applications were still being processed. It is too early to tell if these improvements in water security have particularly benefited women or children.

> *Before we were just stealing water. Now we are sure to get the water we need [for irrigation]. As a result, future yields will be assured, which will give us higher income and better food security for their families.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

> *Today we are better off economically; we can cultivate twice a year [thanks to dry season irrigation infrastructure]. The project has helped us gain the confidence that in future our water supply is safe [i.e. an assured supply], so that we can continue our irrigation activities.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

[41] Transport costs around TZS 12,000 for a round trip (£4.00).
[42] No issues were noted with regard to responding to requests from informal dwellers (Msimbazi).

> *Legal entitlement to water has helped us get a financial loan [for our irrigation scheme]. We are very happy. We have been trying to get a loan for a long time but have failed. Now our production will benefit.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

Figure 6. Irrigation scheme in Kilombero Valley for which WUPs have been applied for

Securing action on pollution control required collaboration by NEMC

Of the three project sites affected by pollution, Msimbazi had not yet secured enforcement action by the BWB as there were complex political economy factors affecting the site, as described in the quotes below. However, anecdotally the dumping of rubbish had been reduced, which improved water quality[43] and reduced the risk of flooding. It is unclear if there will be beneficial impacts at a later date as action by the regulating agency, NEMC, and by the polluting industry itself are outside of the project's control.

> *People are throwing less garbage into the river thanks to our work. Now they burn the garbage in pits instead. But we are not sure if our sensitisation work is sustainable. Garbage collection is a delicate issue here; there are only three trucks for 59 wards and our ward is the dirtiest.* – Mashahidi, Msimbazi

> *We know about these problems [with this industry] – there is a lot of cheating in this country. When the regulator visits the site, they comply, but as soon as NEMC leaves the factory turns the water treatment facility off again. Up to now people were afraid to react, but thanks to Uhakika the pollution [problem] is now out in the open. Now the industries know that they are being closely watched.* – Project core staff member (NEMC)

> *The BWBs don't have the autonomy they need to do their job properly. They are under a lot of political pressure.* – Sector donor

The second site, which is affected by pollution from artisanal mining, also shows no improvement, and showcases the political complexities of enforcement action, where bribes are given to the VEC:

> *The miners stopped their activities for three months around election time (Sept–Dec 2015). We noticed, as the water was less polluted then. We know that they share their [mining] profits with the VEC so that they can continue their activities [illegally]. They must have*

[43] Cholera rates were reported to have declined. Even though contamination from rubbish dumping can increase cholera, the evaluation team feel that progress has mostly been achieved due to factors outside of the project: namely, the government's efforts to distribute water purification tables and to raise awareness about the disease pathways of cholera.

> *stopped when their previous VEC was transferred away. Now that they have become friends with the new VEC, they have now started mining again.* – Mashahidi, Mkindo

In the third site affected by pollution from a nearby textile factory – Ngerengere – NEMC succeeded in commencing the process of constructing a new water treatment facility. This outcome was not a direct result of the project, as it was part of an enforcement process that NEMC had begun before the project started, but NEMC staff felt that the project contributed to getting this outcome secured more quickly. Of the two project communities affected, one claimed that water quality had already improved while another saw no change[44]. Nonetheless the fact that a process is underway for the construction of a new water treatment facility indicates that it is highly likely that water quality will improve for affected communities in future – a successful outcome for the project.

> *We've been putting the pressure [on 21st Century Textiles] for a long time but compliance takes time. They have already come a long way. Now finally they are building a waste water facility. We took a water sample last week; it looks like the pH is now within normal limits thanks to our efforts. Uhakika did help though by raising public awareness on the issue; this helped things to move forward faster.* – NEMC personnel

> *There is still no change in the river. Right now it is raining a lot so it is hard to tell. If the river were cleaner people would suffer less from diseases. This river is life for us, receiving no response from the government [on the pollution] is heart-breaking. These industries are powerful. The government does not want to get involved with such powerful people.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere site

> Before when we washed with river water we got itching of skin. Now the water is cleaner *and no itching. Those black colours are no longer seen in the river and the smell has gone. […] The changes in the river are because of this project, because of our letter and the response we saw. We were making regular follow up and have seen the change this has brought. […] Formerly, when we used the water to irrigate, the plants 'dried' and we had poor harvests. Before we would [harvest] 20 buckets from half an acre, now we get 40 even 50, now the water is clean. We get TZS 400 000 per harvest rather than 200 000. Before we weren't able to buy uniforms and books, and now we are sure we can pay for things and meet our family's needs. Living standards have improved and we're sure [to meet our] basic needs, food, clothes.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere site

Figure 7. Polluted river at the project site of Msimbazi

[44] As the project does not have a budget to systematically monitor water quality these claims could not be verified. Taking a spot sample would have been too strongly affected by seasonal rainfall to make it possible to detect a meaningful trend.

3.3.3 Impacts on conflict over water in project communities

Likely contribution to the reduction of future water conflicts in some project sites

The project aimed to contribute to improving sector performance, which it was hoped would lead to an increase in the number of conflicts being resolved at national level (one of the impact indicators in the logframe). Below we first set out the impacts of the project on conflict within the project sites themselves, and then continue to discuss the implications for conflict resolution at the national level.

Four out of Uhakika's eight active project sites had a history of conflicts – one involved competition over water within unregulated irrigation schemes (Kilombero), a second site involved over-abstraction with a diesel pump affecting downstream users (Kikuletwa), a third involved disputes over land rights (Mkindo), and the last case involved a longstanding conflict between up- and downstream users (Yaeda) (see Section 2.4 for full information on each site). The evaluation team was only able to interview communities from one of these four sites: Kilombero. In the other sites, insights are based on views gained from the project team.

In Yaeda and Mkindo both BWB staff and project staff reported limited progress in resolving conflicts as both involved longstanding disputes over not just water but also land rights and livestock, which could not be easily resolved in two to three years (see quote below).

> *Yaeda is not a simple conflict to resolve. It takes time and resources. The Mashahidi helped make the conflict better known, as the irrigators met with the DIE. It did not make the conflict worse. But the project could help get the WUA established [which has a mandate for conflict resolution]. The people have asked for one but the BWB does not have the resources[45] to support them for now.* – Head of a BWB

In the Kilombero Valley the evidence does suggest that the project helped avoid *future* conflict, as the expansion of unregulated irrigation schemes in Kilombero is likely to increase misallocation of water. Securing a WUP thanks to project efforts ensures consultation between different water users, which helps to prevent conflict over water (see quote below). For example, in the village of Kilama, project staff reported that explaining the impact that over-abstraction would have on downstream users was one of the factors which led the community to abandon the expansion of their irrigation scheme, thereby avoiding further conflict over water in future. Efforts of the project to include fishermen in the WUA may also contribute to reducing conflict between irrigators and fisheries in the future. A similar impact on avoiding future water conflict may be seen in another project site, in Kikuletwa, where project staff suggested that by assisting the WUA to regulate use of diesel pumps the project could contribute to helping resolve unequal water distribution in future, though further information could not be obtained from the communities themselves. Overall, establishing the contribution of project efforts to conflict reduction or conflict avoidance remains challenging.

> *Now we have a voice on water use. If anyone comes here to use water they will need to ask us first. If we did not have a permit we fear that investors would come [upstream] and then there would not be enough water for us.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

No evidence of negative community impacts, despite challenges of managing expectations

While one of the purposes of actions by Mashahidi was to highlight bottlenecks in the government's responsiveness in respect of the project's advocacy work, this purpose appeared to be at odds with the community's expectations of finding a resolution to their water issues within the project time-frame. Mashahidi from four out of the six communities interviewed by the evaluation team felt the knowledge that they had gained was not detailed enough to allow them to continue to pursue

[45] The establishment of a WUA costs around TZS 20–50 million.

responsible government agencies on their own beyond project end, until water issues are resolved (this is discussed further in Section 3.6.1).

Project staff reported that they did not have a clear strategy at project start regarding how to deal with communities where the Mashahidi did not receive a favourable response. The project's risk register and first AR highlighted that misplaced expectations by communities could increase the likelihood that they might choose a confrontational approach, such as protesting or vandalism, to resolve their water issues (AR 2014). Project staff felt that such a confrontational approach could escalate local conflicts and could jeopardise the project's constructive advocacy approach with the government. The evaluation team found no evidence of the project making conflicts worse by inciting confrontational action. The risk that advocacy work at community level will result in reprisals appears to be low.

> *We are not afraid. [The industry] cannot do us anything. We could come to the meeting with the [ward-level] government. We are sure that they are in the wrong. Unless the person is corrupt he will see that he has done wrong and will change his ways.* – Mashahidi, Msimbazi site

However, two sites affected by pollution mentioned that they intend to pursue a more confrontational approach, such as contacting the media.

> *Letter writing will never work. The industry is too powerful. We need to speak to the media. But what if they misrepresent our story? What if they take bribes from the polluters to keep quiet?* – Community member, Msimbazi site

> *If we continue to not get answers then we lose hope. We're speaking out but nothing is happening.* – Mashahidi, Msimbazi site

In response to learning in project sites, the project has now developed a ladder of options to escalate issues where Mashahidi do not receive a favourable response to their requests: first, face to face meetings with responsible government agencies will be organised, and then issues will be escalated to the press. This approach is successfully being rolled out in WWI's work in Zambia. In some sites the project also put communities in touch with other parties willing to consider a more confrontational approach, such as taking legal action against the state or other parties.

3.3.4 Iterative lesson-learning and adjustment by the project team

Given the novelty of applying social accountability approaches to the water sector in Tanzania, iterative lesson-learning and adjustment by the project team is key. Such adjustment was based on updates on progress on the APs received from Mashahidi, and on regular feedback received from project staff after their community visits. The team also held an internal reflection meeting in May 2015 to discuss challenges and capture lessons, alongside monthly or fortnightly management calls between the Shahidi and WWI team.

Feedback on project implementation was solicited from Mashahidi after each site visit. Initially, the feedback was intended to be given in writing but it was adjusted to verbal feedback due to: (i) preference expressed by community members to give more direct verbal feedback through group discussion with project staff; and (ii) due to written records being cumbersome and impractical in field situations with illiterate or time-constrained stakeholders (AR 2015). The project team ensured consensus around the feedback was obtained by discussing it in group sessions where the community could flag any points of disagreement. The group discussions were recorded by project staff. This process was effective at providing the project team with an accurate overview of progress made and any issues encountered by, or recommendations made by, Mashahidi.

In order to allow these insights to feed into any adjustments needed in regard to project implementation, the intention was to discuss the feedback from the community and core team insights as a project team in a debriefing session after each site visit. However, in practice, staff often returned tired after a long time in the field. The project staff who visited a given community wrote detailed field reports after each trip. However, the project manager reported that her workload may have affected her ability to synthesise these reports into practical lessons regarding carrying out social accountability work with communities. Several staff reported that having a shorter report template and more time dedicated to reflecting and adapting the approach could have facilitated lesson-learning from community work (see recommendations made in Section 5.2).

Despite these minor challenges, key adjustments were made during the project lifetime that improved the effectiveness of the programme. Key lessons have emerged, which are being applied in Phase II of the programme (March 2016 onwards), which *Shahidi wa Maji* and WWI are implementing in Tanzania and Zambia. Examples of adjustments to implementation include the following:

- any small expenses incurred by Mashahidi that acted as a barrier to the implementation of APs were identified, and covered by the project budget;
- project core team members were employed more intensively than originally planned in regard to implementing project activities, to compensate for any staffing shortages among the salaried project staff;
- once it became clear that planned advocacy activities would require additional funds and would take longer than planned, additional funds were sought (and secured) to extend project activities for another six months (April to October 2016);
- in order to overcome the challenges experienced in collaborating with other iNGOs, work is planned to document and understand the causes of fragmentation in the sector;
- in Zambia and under the Phase II work in Tanzania, communication with Mashahidi is being improved, by writing up all minutes of meetings with Mashahidi, so that they can be referred to as a record at a later point in time;
- in Zambia, the sustainability of knowledge transfer to communities is being improved by handing out a two-page summary of IWRM legislation in the community after the training is finished, so that the community can refer to it;
- in Zambia and under the Phase II work in Tanzania the likelihood that Mashahidi can sustain their engagement with government agencies is being improved by organising face to face meetings with these. In this way, Mashahidi are able to ask agency staff specific a questions to better understand why, for example, no regulatory action has been taken in their site; and
- in Zambia and under the Phase II work in Tanzania the management of community expectations is being improved by putting communities in need of WASH infrastructure in touch with other NGOs or donors which could provide such infrastructure.

3.4 Effectiveness and impact of national advocacy work

The effectiveness of advocacy and other policy-level activities can be understood as being the degree to which they raised the knowledge and awareness of key stakeholders within and outside the water sector, of government staff, political leaders and of the general public on water management issues and the structural constraints that underlie them (outputs stated in the logframe) – and the degree to which they instilled a greater sense of ownership over, and a duty to resolve and act on, these issues. The intended logframe outcome was increased budget allocation to frontline WRM authorities: the BWBs of the MoWI. The intended impact cited in the logframe was improved sector performance, reflected in the logframe indicators of an increase in the number of legal permissions for water resource use granted, monitored and complied with in Tanzania, and improvements in water conflict resolution.

The potential of scaling up SAM work through an advocacy platform is discussed separately in Section 3.6.4. The effectiveness of lesson-sharing with stakeholders outside of Tanzania is covered under Section 3.6.6.

Box 3. Key findings on the effectiveness and impact of national advocacy activities

- The advocacy strategy was designed mid-way through the project: it was deliberately phased so that it could be informed by insights from the community-level work. **Most advocacy activities were completed at the time of the evaluation.** The political climate around the October 2015 presidential elections posed some challenges, and caused some delays, for advocacy work: for example, TV spots and radio dramas could only be aired in February 2016.
- **Four national 'learning-by-doing' workshops with government and other sector stakeholders were successful in raising awareness amongst attendees**. Of the 110 individuals who attended, 76% reported newly acquired capability and intent to apply the knowledge gained**.** Furthermore, involving BWB and NEMC staff directly in the implementation of community-level project activities also provided the unintended benefits of enhanced workplace motivation amongst staff. However, the technical policy briefs detailing how recommendations from the advocacy work could be implemented were not yet completed at the time of the evaluation, which may have limited the project's impact on sector performance to date.
- **The project generated important insights into the specific challenges relating to WRM processes, and showcased the impacts this is having on communities using insights from case studies. These were communicated to government, donors and the public.** The presentations at the Joint Water Sector Review (JWSR) in 2014 and 2015 were particularly effective. Being able to present findings at the JWSR on behalf of the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (TAWASANET), which has a formal role in the sector dialogue mechanism, strengthened the weight of the messages delivered. However, availability of BWB and NEMC staff and staff turnover within donors posed some challenge in regard to sector engagement.
- **Analysis undertaken by the project in 2014 clearly highlighted staffing and funding shortfalls facing BWBs,** allowing the project to advocate for increased budget allocation to the BWBs. However, limited project funds posed some challenges in regard to the depth and quality of the analysis in 2014.
- **The project's full contribution is not yet visible in some logframe indicators at impact and outcome level. Advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts, which posed challenges in setting impact-level indicators for advocacy work, given the extensive contextual factors affecting sector performance.** However, the technical policy briefs detailing how recommendations from the advocacy work could be implemented were not yet completed at the time of the evaluation, which may have limited the project's impact on sector performance to date. While a four-fold increase in donor funding to WRM was seen over the lifetime of the project, interviewed donors reported that these investments were made independently of the project. However, the advocacy work planned for mid-2016 with funding levered by this initial UK Aid Direct investment is likely to contribute to increased funding allocations to WRM in future.

3.4.1 Progress on national advocacy work

Advocacy strategy was designed mid-way through the project

Project activities were sequenced in such a way that community-level work could generate insights into the bottlenecks facing the government institutions responsible for WRM and into the opportunities for improved institutional performance[46], with these insights then used to draw up targeted advocacy messages. The advocacy work was deliberately phased to enable it to be informed by the community-level work.

The process of turning the project's experiences into advocacy messages took place at the advocacy workshop (March 2015). The workshop was able to build on discussions held by the project staff with service providers in each project site, to better understand what constraints these were facing.

The workshop used a participatory 'problem tree analysis' approach to encourage workshop attendees to identify the root causes of service delivery issues identified in project sites. A range of other participatory approaches were then used to draw up the main advocacy messages, identify the stakeholders to whom these advocacy messages would be targeted and choose the appropriate channel for delivering these advocacy messages to improve institutional performance (WWI 2015, pp.11–12). Four tailored advocacy plans were drawn up, targeting parliamentarians, MoWI staff, WUAs and communities. Specific recommendations for overcoming policy bottlenecks in each project site were also written up separately in the form of case study bulletins, in late 2015.

The insights and experiences of workshop participants were used to bring out the underlying causes of poor sector performance, specifically the challenges facing BWB and NEMC as government authorities responsible for WRM. A 'trees of change' approach was used to set out different advocacy activities and then outline how these would lead to a desired outcome: for example, securing adequate budget for WUAs support. This step was crucial to ensure that the advocacy strategy was appropriate and realistic.

The final step of the advocacy strategy was to accompany advocacy messages with verbal policy guidance provided to MoWI through the JWSR meetings and written technical briefs. Presentations to the JWSR were made in 2014 and 2015. While the case study bulletins included recommendations for how to address water resource issues identified in case studies, the detailed technical briefs on priority issues were not completed in time for the evaluation. These are planned for mid-2016.

Some delays to advocacy work due to political constraints and for budgetary reasons

The vast majority of advocacy activities had been completed at the time of the evaluation. The only outstanding activities were the outreach work planned with MPs and the technical policy briefs.

Two instances of political constraints affected the implementation of advocacy activities. Firstly, the presidential elections in October 2015 delayed project delivery as the project was not allowed to carry out community-level work or work with the parliament in the three months prior to the elections. The work with the parliament has been delayed until mid-2016, so that it can influence the next government budget review in July 2016. The filming, production and airing of TV spots and radio dramas was also put on hold; such spots could only be aired in February 2016. The government staff who had agreed to appear in the films could not participate formally due to the presidential elections. Some interviewed government staff felt that NEMC and the BWB may feel less ownership over these communication pieces as they were not able to feature government staff.

[46] WWI 2013, tender document.

Secondly, the introduction of a new 'cyber law' in 2015 had potential legal implications for project staff and partners (AR 2015). The law requires all data and information to be approved by a senior government official before being published on websites. As a result, any data requested from the government needed to be first approved for public use by government project partners (MoWI and NEMC). This poses challenges for repeating the budget and expenditure analysis in future.

In addition to these political constraints, limited project funds also restricted the scale and reach of advocacy activities. For this reason, the technical policy briefs were delayed until mid-2016. Additional Scottish funding is secured from mid-2016 up to October 2016, to allow the project to continue its advocacy work.

3.4.2 Effectiveness of national advocacy activities

Awareness was raised amongst government staff through policy workshops

The project held four national and regional learning-by-doing workshops for a range of audiences. Two of these were held in 2014: the first introducing the social accountability approach, and the second sharing the methodology and findings of the budget and expenditure analysis. The 2015 workshop drew up the advocacy approach and the 2016 regional learning workshop shared lessons and insights from the Uhakika project.

As the evaluation team was only present at the last of these workshops, insights on their design and effectiveness drew on the feedback written up in workshop reports and on interviews with two former participants. According to this information, attendees found all workshops very useful for getting a better understanding of the SAM approach and of the key lessons, as well as for obtaining the findings from the budget and expenditure analysis. The participatory approach taken was particularly valued by interviewed participants – especially for the advocacy workshop and the regional learning workshop. As undertaking budget and expenditure analysis is a complex process, two participants felt that while they gained useful insights into some of the challenges of undertaking such an analysis, follow-on training would be needed in future to a support them in replicating the analysis elsewhere. The mixed audiences of each workshop may have posed a challenge for pitching the content to the varied levels of experience of the audience[47].

Sharing project insights at key sector meetings was effective in raising awareness among wider sector stakeholders

The presentations at the JWSR in 2014 and 2015 and accompanying Water Sector Equity Reports were effective in raising awareness of specific challenges in implementing WRM policies and showcased the impacts this is having on communities, using insights from case studies. The fact that *Shahidi wa Maji* could use its membership of TAWASANET to present at these key sector meetings was a key success factor in strengthening the weight of the advocacy messages. Posters[48] produced by the project on BWB's work were well received and contributed to raising the profile of WRM among government stakeholders, donors and the public.

> *The project's presentation at the JWSR in 2014 sent shockwaves through the sector; particularly by highlighting the funding shortfalls facing the BWB.* – Sector donor

[47] This challenge was also mentioned in the staff's internal reflection meeting (May 2015). For example, the budget workshop in July 2014 was attended by 18 representatives from CSOs and NGOs, and by two government staff. The advocacy workshop in March 2015 was attended by nine representatives from CSOs and NGOs, four government staff, one representative from the media, one community member and one academic.

[48] The posters set out all laws relating to water security and, in one column, duties of citizens, and in a second the duties of government. They included contact numbers, emails and addresses of each responsible BWB and of the NEMC. 1,200 posters were distributed to all nine river basins and to hundreds of district and ward offices.

A further achievement was the nomination of a project staff member to be the civil society's representative on the National Water Board (NWB) in 2015. This was an unexpected benefit, one which was not included as an output in the logframe. While it is too early to tell what impact this will have, it will undoubtedly contribute to advancing arguments for pro-poor WRM within the NWB.

Added benefit of awareness-raising and workplace motivation among government counterparts as a result of community work

In addition to the advocacy activities planned, the community work itself increased levels of understanding about how WRM impacts development within BWB and NEMC staff. All government officials interviewed agreed that the project had succeeded in raising awareness amongst their staff on WRM issues. While this was an unexpected benefit not set out in the project design, involving BWB and NEMC staff directly in the implementation of community-level project activities as part of the core team was a clear success factor in raising awareness amongst BWB staff.

> *The project has helped us uncover issues which we can now respond to.* – Head of a BWB

> *The BWB always sing the same song: we have no funds. The project is doing many things which the BWB has not been able to do [themselves] – because [the BWB] has limited budget to visit communities. The project is also helping us to identify the [water] problems which we did not know about before. The project has made the BWB more aware of their role – formally we were just relaxing as there are no funds. But now they realise there are [still] problems out there and they have woken up.* – Core project staff member (BWB)

The project was particularly well-perceived by those government actors whom it helped overcome certain issues they were facing in their jobs. For example, knowledge gained by DIEs made it easier for them to secure WUPs for their schemes, and being part if project implementation made it easier for CDO of the BWB to carry out the community visits which are part of their job, but which they rarely have funds for. The box below summarises the project contributions which BWB and NWB staff mentioned had directly facilitated the BWB's work.

> *The project is helping me do my job. The irrigation schemes are my subjects; all of them need a WUP. Now they know that their water is secure.* – District Water Engineer

> *I like having the opportunity to raise awareness amongst the communities. I am learning new techniques on how to work with communities and am meeting other BWB staff from other basins. I have learned many new things, this project has raised my profile and given me exposure to new ideas.* – Core project staff member (BWB)

Box 4. Contributions to BWB's work, according to interviewed BWB and NWB staff

- Involved BWB staff from each basin that the project worked in, in **community visits and participatory analysis and planning** with 603 citizens to support awareness-raising on water issues and water-related law.
- **Designed and distributed posters** which simplify legal provisions, citizens' rights, and government responsibilities relating to water security, and provided points of contacts for BWBs, NEMC and complaints (translated into to Kiswahili).
- **Production and dissemination of short, high quality films** and one longer feature which explains the BWBs' functions and the importance of WRM in English and Kiswahili. The project also funded the airing of these films over a four-week period.
- **Production of four radio dramas** focusing on key functions of the BWBs and NEMC and repeated airing of these on national and local radio networks. These were also distributed to 165 sector stakeholders on USB sticks.
- **Facilitated application of several WUPs in Wami/Ruvu and IDB Basin**: two WUP were issued in Kilombero, one is being processed; ten WUP were issued in Mbulu, five are being processed.
- **Facilitated establishment of one WUA** in Mgeta (Wami/Ruvu Basin), co-financed by Lions Club.
- **Facilitated strengthening of one WUA** in Mkindo (Wami/Ruvu Basin): created a simple tool for climate vulnerability assessments (with co-financing from iWASH).

Too early to gauge the level of awareness-raising among the public

The project's awareness-raising strategy with the public was based on the premise that most people in Tanzania know that some rivers are polluted, but people do not necessarily know the extent of exposure to these risks, nor which government agencies are responsible for equitable WRM. The advocacy workshop set out that awareness-raising with the public should 'improve knowledge and skills and enhance WRM practices' (Joseph *et al.* 2015). Radio dramas and TV spots, for example, provided insights through testimonies from communities but also showed the role and statutory duties of citizens, BWBs and NEMC in addressing these. The project also produced posters in Kiswahili explaining key elements of WRM to the public, distributed to BWB, district and ward offices.

The production of radio dramas and films was delayed as a result of the presidential elections, and were aired in February 2016. The project team chose not to invest in a public opinion survey as this was deemed to represent poor value for money. The impacts which the radio dramas and films will have on public awareness will instead be assessed through focus group discussions in mid-2016. Despite these monitoring data not yet being available at the time of the evaluation, most interviewed government staff felt that the project had already contributed to raising awareness amongst the public (see quotes below). It is, however, important to place these contributions in the context of other awareness-raising work on WRM also done by the government.

> *The project has been helpful in spreading the message about water in communities. Before people just complained, they didn't know what to do to get a permit; they did not know who was responsible or who to ask for information. The [project's] posters have been helpful for this.* – Community Development Officer of a BWB

> *If you ask someone on the street they will not know what the BWB do. The project is now sharing the role of the BWB with everyone and also explaining people their rights. The project has popularised the BWB. Personally I see the change compared to three years ago.* – Project core staff member (BWB)

> *The [project's] radio and TV programmes have been great. Our BWB also has a communication strategy and we are planning TV and radio programmes but for now we do not have funds to implement it.* – Head of a BWB

> *When I started here in 2002 nobody was aware about water. Now maybe 50% of villagers have that awareness – thanks to the radio programmes that our Ministry has done. The*

project has also helped – it taught communities why they need a WUP. This has simplified our job. – Head of a BWB

Importance of assessing the effectiveness of different advocacy channels

Given the novelty of using SAM in the water sector, it is important to understand which elements of the project's advocacy work were effective in encouraging a constructive dialogue with government. This will be important for ensuring that advocacy work is well received by government. Monitoring the impact of advocacy work is key for programmatic learning and for demonstrating the value of the SAM approach to others stakeholders.

Given that advocacy messages take time to translate into impacts at policy level, it is too early to tell which advocacy channels were most effective. The project has made significant efforts to share its insights through various workshops and sector meetings, to ensure messages reach government, donors and civil society—in addition to having key members of these groups as members of the PAC. Attendance of high-level government staff and donors is key for effectiveness, to ensure the messages reach decision-makers. The Minister of Water and Irrigation, for example, attended the project's presentation at the JWSR in 2015.

Additionally, presenting insights at the Annual General Meeting of BWBs could have been an additional important channel for influencing the BWB. While project staff were invited to attend the 2015 session, despite the staff's requests, they were unfortunately not invited to present their insights. Future sessions may offer this opportunity.

3.4.3 Impact of national-level advocacy on performance of Tanzanian water sector

The intended impact of national-level advocacy work was improved sector performance, reflected in the logframe indicators through an increase in the number of legal permissions for water resource use granted, monitored and complied with in Tanzania and improvements in water conflict resolution. The intended process by which the project was to contribute towards this impact was advocating for increased budget allocation to the BWBs of the MoWI (which is an outcome in the logframe).

The project highlighted the staffing and funding shortfalls facing BWBs

In 2014 the project undertook an analysis of budget allocations and expenditure flows to highlight the staffing and funding gaps for WRM within the sector. The methodology and findings were shared in a workshop, with attendees including eight government staff. Inviting government staff to the workshop was intended to improve the reliability of the analysis by making it possible to draw on their intimate knowledge of the budgeting and financial management processes used in the MoWI. It was also intended that these staff would thus be able to vouch for the credibility of the analysis and its outputs at a later date. Furthermore, it was hoped that participating government staff would use the insights gained regarding funding and staffing shortages to advocate for change within their departments. Project staff commented that the news that third party scrutiny of expenditures and external budget analysis was being carried out by a CSO was hoped to have positive impact on levels of integrity within the sector, and to guard against budget abuses. Anecdotally, it appears that one government staff member from Pangani Basin felt that government staff now scrutinise budgets and expenditure more closely, as a result of participating in the project's budget training, though this information could not be verified.

The project understood the sensitive nature of the findings from its budget and expenditure analysis and chose to share these findings only with the MoWI, donors and sector NGOs, and not with the wider public. The analysis revealed shortfalls in accounting and showcased the high proportion of funds unaccounted for and spent on consultants on contractors – therefore not painting the

government in the most favourable light. Nonetheless, by highlighting the staffing and funding shortfalls facing BWB directly with the MoWI the project was able to advocate for increased budget allocation to the BWBs. The government has made a commitment to undertake a 'financing of the WRM sector study' in future, to better understand these funding shortfalls.

> *The project's presentation at the JWSR in 2014 highlighted the funding shortfalls facing the BWB. It was received in a mixed manner: the Minister mentioned to me later that he would have preferred to have heard the feedback earlier, than only finding out at the JWSR. Shahidi's presentation at the JWSR in 2015 was, however, much more constructive; it contained excellent data and insights from the field.* – Sector donor

The project lacked funds to repeat this analysis in 2015, as gaining access to the necessary financial data from MoWI and the treasury was time-consuming, as was the process for checking the data received with reported information in each basin.

In-depth analysis can facilitate advocacy for policy change

Project staff explained that limited project funds did not allow the project to have a full-time dedicated budget expert on the project team, which may have limited the depth and quality of the budget and expenditure analysis undertaken, as the difficulties in obtaining reliable data on budgets from government stretched the resources available for this work. To ensure its effectiveness, it is essential that the analysis is clearly presented and credible. One staff member suggested that triple-checking the data through interviews with CDOs in each BWB – who are the people who are most aware of the actual activities carried out by each basin – may have improved the reliability of the data. With additional funds, the project would be able to carry our additional disaggregated analysis in future, which could strengthen the evidence behind certain advocacy messages (see recommendations made in Section 5.2).

> *The CSO voice used to be very biased towards WASH. Now thanks to this project there is more voice on WRM. But CSOs need to do more to document the progress so far and compare it to where the baseline was. This analysis is needed regularly: what progress has been made, where are there still gaps? How far are we from our goal?* – Director of Water Resources within the MoWI

The advocacy work planned for mid-2016 is likely to contribute to improved processes and increased allocations to WRM within the sector in future

As advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts, interviews with donors and government staff suggested that to date the project has not yet been able to make a contribution towards increasing funding allocations towards WRM. However, the technical policy briefs and the advocacy work planned with parliament in mid-2016 are likely to positively affect funding allocation in future, as they will focus on key decision-makers within the governments and donors who are able to influence budget allocations (see quote below). Project staff explained that some lobbying work for increased allocations to WRM has already taken place at the Climate Change Forum, the environmental feeder group to the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) initiative and with the IUCN country board.

> *I have come to realise that WRM is not a priority for this government. Look at the budget. Listen to the parliament; they only think about water supply. It is a problem of mind-set. And this project is trying to change the mind-set of the people. Next we need to change the mind-set of the politicians who decide the budget every year.* – Core staff (BWB)

Forthcoming technical policy briefs are planned to focus on the following policy elements to improve sector performance: proposing a transition to a risk-based regulatory system which matches enforcement efforts to risk levels; risk-based permit determination; enforceable permits; activation of

the polluter pays principle as a cost recovery mechanism and deterrent; development of a coherent enforcement policy and the need for a nationally consistent incident recording system; illegality of charging for water use in the absence of a permit; accreditation of environmental inspectors and training on evidence collection procedures; schemes for delegation and service level agreements to improve coordination between government actors; working group on WUA effectiveness; and revision of BWB key performance indicators and planning frameworks.

Logframe figures report that donor investment on WRM has increased four-fold over the lifetime of the project. Significant investments have been made by different donors since project start, including USD $90 million by DFID, $60 million by the World Bank, $27 million by USAID and $2 million by GIZ. Donors interviewed reported that these investments were made independent of the project, though it is possible that donor staff interviewed, who had been in post for less than two years, were not aware of the impacts of previous work done by WWI prior to Uhakika, including the Joint Supervision Mission held under the WSDP in 2009. As the project regularly engages with all key sector donors through the TWG, it is likely that this could lead to increased investment in the future. The donor investments that have already been secured are an encouraging development for the sector and demonstrate an understanding by donors of the need to invest in WRM. Based on interviews with the heads of the two BWBs who oversee the basins where the eight active project sites are located it appears, however, that increased funding at national level has not yet translated into more funds for frontline delivery by the BWB. This discrepancy highlights the need for continued advocacy work by organisations like *Shahidi wa Maji* to ensure that staffing and funding shortfalls are addressed.

> *There is no improvement [in our funding]; we have actually received less funds this year*. – Head of a BWB

> *Yes our budget allocations have increased but this is not due to the project. Funds have increased because this year we are supposed to implement and disseminate the new IWRM plan*. – Head of a BWB

> *The funds we received from NWB are still not enough [to carry out our duties]. We have secured additional funds from our NGO projects[49] but not from government*. – Head of a BWB

Combining advocacy work with clear solutions and recommendations for responsible agencies could strengthen its contribution towards improving sector performance

The project design was well suited to raising the voice of water users. The project also aimed to improve accountability within the sector by presenting the views of the project's water users to the service providers (NEMC and BWB) through the JWSR and other channels, in order to encourage service providers to be answerable for their actions, and to explain how they intend to address the issues raised. In an accountable relationship, responsible government agencies are accountable for, and take responsibility for, their actions, while rights holders (water users) are able to hold these agencies to account (Brown *et al.* 2008). However, in a context of low-capacity and resource-constrained governments and service providers there is a risk that the voice of small community-level water users can go unheard or have limited impact on decision-making or service provision. The project handbook comments that while the project aimed to bring reliable information about problems into the public domain, to incentivise those responsible to take action, the experiences of this project show that this process takes time and tenacious engagement, because in some cases powerful interests are very resilient in the face of, and unaffected by, public perceptions (Hepworth *et al.* 2016).

[49] This comment refers to the USAID-funded iWASH project.

In short, there are limits to the SAM approach where power is resilient. In order to play a stronger role in influencing strong vested interests within government, interviewed BWB and NEMC staff, donors and NGO actors mentioned that they hoped the project had more clearly proposed solutions to the sectoral issues it raised (see quotes below). For example, while the budget and expenditure analysis undertaken by the project clearly highlighted funding gaps, some government staff felt that advocacy messages should have also highlighted the constraints facing disbursement levels for BWBs, which have a knock-on effect on allocated funding. These comments suggest that if the project were to engage more with the 'supply side' of accountability, this could strengthen the impact of the project's advocacy work. Lessons from other social accountability programmes suggest that the generation of clear solutions and recommendations is often the weakest element of SAM programmes, with some programmes leaving it largely to chance how changes in policy will happen as a result of SAM work (Tembo 2013).

> *For me and my staff [the project] has perhaps focused our minds on where the [WRM] issues are [in our basin], but the project has not helped us with what to do next. It has not helped us find solutions. For example, where WUAs are not functional, the project could raise awareness on the importance of a WUA.* – Head of a BWB

> *When this project was designed it should have thought more about sustainability. NEMC will need to continue their work – but how? The project has raised awareness [about pollution issues] with the polluters as well as the public – but now how will it be sustained? Awareness-raising is like a baby that needs to be nurtured. Now do you just bring the baby and leave it there? We need to make sure to capture what was learned from Ngerengere so that NEMC can apply it elsewhere.* – NEMC personnel

> *Any advocacy programme needs to be careful to be very balanced. It needs to investigate who the policies are favouring? What does practice tell us about what works? This analysis can then be the basis for policy recommendations.* – NGO actor

However, project staff reported that while they strived to highlight underlying causes, in some cases assessing why action had not been taken by a responsible agency was not straight-forward. In these circumstances the project opted to highlight the bottlenecks to service delivery and to promote public deliberation around the issue to encourage the sector to reflect on the underlying causes:

> *Instead of losing our credibility, we only proposed solutions where we could say for sure what the underlying problem was. In other cases where we were less clear we posed pointed questions to encourage reflection around the issue*. – Salaried project staff member

Donor staff turnover posed some challenges in regard to meaningful engagement with donors in relation to taking up recommendations from advocacy work in their capacity-strengthening programmes

The project team has taken steps to share its insights with key donors in the sector, such as DFID, USAID and the World Bank (AR 2015), and though the TWG. For example, the project team reported that they were able to advise on the design of DFID's new £70 million Water Security programme by drawing on insights generated by Uhakika, including on how to improve supply side accountability, and how to negotiate the difficult political economy facing improved BWB functioning. Future work planned under Phase II includes lobbying donors to set up a practitioner-to-practitioner network, to build the capacity of BWBs and to strengthen the 'supply side' of accountability

Donors who were interviewed welcomed such initiatives and felt that the project could play an important role in making specific recommendations on how other capacity-strengthening donor programmes could guide their investments to strengthen the sector. While some government stakeholders hoped the project had more clearly proposed solutions to the sectoral issues it raised, helping the government implement these recommendations is clearly beyond the mandate and

budget of this advocacy project and this is an activity that is more suited to other donor capacity-strengthening programmes.

However, in some cases the project faced challenges in engaging with some donors in meaningful ways in order to encourage them to take up recommendations from advocacy work. It took the project two years to be invited to the TWG and the Donor Partnership Group on water. Over the lifetime of the project, the donor counterpart on water changed three times in DFID, four times in GIZ and three times in the World Bank. One donor also expressed reservations about whether it was the donor's role to fund an accountability role in respect of WSDP investments to which the same donors contribute.

Challenging to select indicators for measuring improved sector performance

It is challenging to set impact-level indicators for advocacy work given the long-term engagement often needed to see impact and given the extensive contextual factors affecting sector performance. The logframe indicators propose to track progress towards the intended impact of national-level advocacy work (improved sector performance) through an increase in the number of legal permissions for water resource use granted, monitored and complied with nationally, and improvements in water conflict resolution, as report by the MoWI's monitoring data[50]. While the project did contribute towards these metrics in its eight active project sites, these only covered a very small proportion of the Tanzanian population. For example, 18 WUPs were in the process of being issued under the project, in comparison to the 764 WUPs[51] issued nationally over the course of the project, according to the MoWI's monitoring data (WSSR 2015).

The project efforts to raise awareness of inefficiencies in WUP permitting and other sectoral bottlenecks have not yet sufficiently contributed to the strengthening of sector processes for this so as to increase permit issuance and conflict resolution at a national level (the logframe indicator); as confirmed through interviews with both donors and government staff. Recommendations for alternative impact indicators, through which one could measure change within the lifetime of the project, are made in Section 5.2.

> *Yes perhaps the project has secured some more WUPs but we have not seen the difference [in our BWB]. The farming in Kilombero is mostly rain-fed so there will have been few applications for WUP. It would have been better to work in the Great Ruaha where very many people have applied for WUPs.* – Head of a BWB

Alternatively, the project could use process tracing to keep track of any actions taken to strengthen sector performance as a result of recommendations made by the project. For example, in response to the project's presentation at the JWSR in 2015, the Minister for Water made a public commitment to addressing the issues raised through a review of water permitting and pollution control enforcement processes (AR 2015). The project contributed to the training that was held, though previously similar training had also been held in other BWBs[52]. Project staff also anecdotally reported that highlighting the backlog of WUP permitting in Mbulu to heads of BWB and to the DWR may contribute to improving permitting processes in future. Interviews by the evaluation team with donors and government staff did not highlight any other similar examples but it is likely that more direct actions will be seen as a result of the technical policy briefs and the advocacy work planned with parliament in mid-2016. Recommendations on capturing project impacts are made in Section 5.2.

[50] Note that these impacts are intended to take place at national level, beyond the project's case study sites (where the project makes a contribution towards permit issuance and water conflict resolution).
[51] At project start, MoWI reported that 3,369 WUPs had been issued (the project had a target of a 20% increase over the baseline: i.e. 4,211 WUP). By project end, MoWI reported that 4,133 WUPs had been issued nationally.
[52] Personal comment by BWB staff.

3.5 Efficiency of project implementation

This section explores whether activities were delivered on time and on budget, and with an efficient use of the resources available. Staffing constraints are discussed, alongside an assessment of the quality of the project's monitoring data.

Box 5. Key findings on the efficiency of project activities

- **Project activities were delivered on budget. The project experienced only minor delays**, due to turnover of the project manager position and the political climate during the 2015 elections. This resulted in a no-cost extension of three months. Project activities are being extended until October 2016 and scaled to a wider geography, with additional funds secured from the Scottish Government.
- **The project used its limited resources efficiently thanks to tight financial management.** Varied skillsets and strong existing sectoral knowledge and networks of staff were key success factors. Community-level activities were delivered at a lower cost than planned (£0.79 per person, compared to £1.00). However the limited funding and related limited staffing posed challenges for engagement with communities and project partners. Some additional funds were also leveraged from iWASH.
- **The internal monitoring information collected by the project could have been more clearly presented, to inform project oversight and management.** For example, the fact that baseline information in project sites as not presented in line with the logframe indicators (e.g. knowledge/awareness levels; number of permits in place; reported conflicts) made it more challenging to systematically demonstrate the changes achieved in project sites.

3.5.1 Delivering activities on time

Minor delays experienced but most advocacy work completed by project end

Project activities experienced some delays, both due to internal factors (turnover of the project manager) and external factors (the political climate during the 2015 presidential elections). The project timeline was amended to account for these challenges, via a no-cost extension secured for three months[53] (AR 2015). The three months of activity lost and the additional costs of re-recruitment of the PM on two occasions were absorbed by the project. This points to the need for contingency funding in future budgets.

Due to these challenges, some aspects of the advocacy delivery work were not completed by project end (see Section 3.4.1). These will be carried out between April and October 2016, after the end of the GPAF period, with the additional funds secured by the project team from the Scottish Government[54].

Community activities completed in eight out of ten project sites

In order to promote cost-effective use of project resources in two out of the ten project sites it was planned for the 'Action learning' phase (following initial scoping) to be carried out by Master's degree students from British and Tanzanian universities, working with the project as interns. This model proved unsuccessful as interns required more support and guidance than anticipated, and outputs produced were of insufficient rigour to be used for advocacy. As a result, activities in these two sites were put on hold, until project staff had time to re-launch activities with additional funds secured from the Scottish Government. As a result, not all APs were implemented in these locations, which affected the outcomes and impacts seen by project end.

[53] A no-cost extension was secured from 31 October until 31 December 2015 and an additional three months were made available after December for completing the evaluation and the forth project workshop.

[54] £450,000 was secured for continuing activities in Tanzania from September 2015 to October 2016, and to adapt and apply the approach in Zambia.

3.5.2 Efficient use of resources

Overall costs kept low through tight financial management

The project made significant efforts to keep costs down by negotiating the price of inputs, combining activities and tight budget oversight from WWI's UK head office:

- Staff salaries were locally benchmarked and per diem allowances were kept at realistic levels[55] rather than tracking the inflated government levels, and were strictly adhered to. Negotiating the secondment of salaried government staff as core team members meant these only needed to be paid out-of-pocket expenses. The payment of a day rate to these core team members (verified with timesheets) rather than a full salary provided further cost savings. Further savings were made on staff costs as the community-level work was implemented through *voluntary* Mashahidi
- Community visits were combined during extended field visits to save costs of transport to and from the project office.
- Day rates for international advisers were brought down against originally budgeted levels via negotiation with consultants.
- All large capital purchases and expenditures (e.g. TV spot production and broadcast, contracting of the independent evaluation) were based on a price comparison of three quotes.
- Water testing equipment was donated to the project at no cost.
- The project's office space in Tanzania was first provided by Twaweza and then by iWASH at zero cost for the first year of the project.
- Quarterly budget projections allowed tight budget oversight by WWI.

No cases were observed of inputs being purchased at too low a price, which could have jeopardised quality. The cost of producing and airing TV spots was, however, more expensive than budgeted. Project staff intend to use a greater level of in-house production and editing for future media productions.

Funds leveraged from other sources

Where opportunities arose, funds were leveraged from other sources to carry out a climate vulnerability analysis[56] and project efforts allowed a BWB to leverage funds from the Lions Club to set up a WUA. Project staff also successfully secured funding from the Scottish Government to complete Uhakika activities, and to extend and scale up the work after project end. Beyond in-kind contributions through the staff time of TAWASANET members, leverage of funds from other NGOs and INGOs for the strengthening of a joint advocacy platform has been limited to printing and production costs of the JWSR report provided by WaterAid in 2014.

Cost-efficiency of project activities

Around 51% of project resources were spent on community-level activities. These activities were delivered at a lower cost than planned (£0.79 per person, compared to the budgeted £1.00 per person) thanks to a large number of community members benefiting, when the security of access to a water source was improved or when steps were taken to protect a water source. Nonetheless, the project could have more clearly stated its assumptions regarding the populations benefiting from project activities (see Section 3.5.4).

[55] Community payments covered refreshments, lunch and transport costs and varied between TZS 2,000 and TZS 3,000 per person, depending on the meeting duration and transport costs. Core team allowances were in line with a project-specific allowance policy benchmarked with other NGO payments at project outset.

[56] iWASH covered the cost of applying a simplified version of the CRiSTAL tool in one project site.

It is less straight-forward to calculate the cost-efficiency of the advocacy work, as the number of people affected is less traceable.

3.5.3 Staff capacity and skillset

Varied skillset and sectoral linkages of staff was a key success factor

To successfully implement this project, project staff required a diverse skillset, including technical knowledge of WRM policy, experience of advocacy work, M&E, community engagement, leadership, communication and project management skills. The fact that the project manager had a good reputation and strong networks within government agencies through her previous job contributed to the successful delivery of community and advocacy work. Insights into the community-level work suggest that staff could have benefited from more training on the details of WRM legislation. Additional training on M&E may also have benefited the recording of the outcomes achieved by the project (see recommendations made in Section 5.2).

> *My work with the head of the BWB would have been very difficult if I had not already known her [from my previous job at the BWB]. The former project manager [of this project] would have struggled*. – Salaried project staff member

Staff shortages posed challenges for engagement with communities and partners

The budget envelope limited the number of staff which could be hired full-time to two full-time equivalents: one full-time project manager, with the part-time support staff, core team and project director contributing an additional full-time equivalent. The core project team's time was used on a call-down basis. The benefit of this approach was that the project benefited from the regional expertise and sectoral networks of the core team. However, the variable availability of core team members complicated the planning of community activities. The limited staff headcount also limited the depth and frequency of engagement with Mashahidi and communities, which had implications for the effectiveness of community-level work (see Section 3.3.1). Similarly, partner liaison demands were higher than expected due to high staff turnover within partner organisations, and sporadic attendance by key partners at workshops and PAC meetings.

The administrative burden of implementing the project across a wide variety of project sites and with a wide array of partners was higher than expected. Succeeding in securing additional Scottish funding to hire a new project administrator, an African programme coordinator, and international programme officer and a programme assistant to support M&E, learning, financial management and documentation will significantly enhance future project delivery. The funds will also be used to retain experienced staff in order to secure the investment already made in building up the team.

3.5.4 Quality of monitoring data

Reported results in the project's logframe are based on two sources: the monitoring data collected by the project, and the WSSR published annually by the MoWI.

Low confidence in the government water sector monitoring data

Data accuracy of the WSSR depends on the strengths of MoWI's own reporting systems. The monitoring and reporting system is considered quite weak, with several WSSRs being incomplete, despite the indicators used in the logframe existing as statuary requirements. This required the project to request additional data around impact indicators from the MoWI (some of which were not available at the time of the evaluation). A wider question of whether these outcomes and impacts reported in the WSSR can be attributed to the project remains and this is addressed in Section 3.4.3.

Internal project monitoring data could be more clearly presented

Regarding the monitoring data collected by the project itself, several points were noted:

- The first project visit to every site generated useful insights into each site; this is referred to as baseline information. The case study files contain contextual information and track progress on outputs. However, the case study files reviewed by the evaluation team suggest that this information could have been more clearly presented to form a baseline for all output, outcome and impact indicators mentioned in the logframe. Limited baseline data was also mentioned as a challenge in the staff's internal reflection meeting in 2015.
- No baseline information on the level of knowledge and awareness by project communities, government and CSOs was recorded in logframe format, though project staff indicated that most informant interviews began with a discussion of current knowledge. The project opted instead to capture the *change* in knowledge and awareness through 'exit surveys' on "new knowledge learned" at the end of community visits or workshops. Such self-reported responses risk being less reliable than collecting independent insights at baseline. Gathering baseline specific information on knowledge could help the project to adjust activities planned in communities or in workshops if necessary, and to tailor them to the varying level of awareness at baseline.
- The evaluation team feel that the outputs reported are a credible account of what had been achieved at the time when the activity took place. Data are collated by the project team and checked by the project manager. However, no follow-up data were collected near project end to check if these outputs were still in place (e.g. if the knowledge gained was retained). This may have posed a challenge for the project manager in regard to addressing sustainability risks regarding the outputs achieved.
- The outcome figures reported (number of people using water resources with legal registration in progress or in place) are based on population census figures (in the case of project villages) or membership numbers (in the case of irrigation associations). While these population numbers were verified with key informants, the project could have more clearly stated its assumptions regarding the proportion of this population using the water sources in relation to which the project intervenes, as this affects whether they can therefore be considered beneficiaries. These assumptions also affect the value for money calculations.

Suitability of the indicators used for monitoring progress

Some of the logframe indicators used to measure progress on outputs appear to be referring to outcomes: Outputs are usually understood as tangible products or services to be delivered by the intervention, while outcomes are seen as the localised result that the intervention seeks to achieve with these tangible products or services[57]. As a result the evaluation team advise renaming the output indicators 1.3, 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2 as outcome indicators. At outcome level, Outcome Indicator 3 (funding allocation to WRM) is closer to an impact than an outcome indicator as it relates to the broader issue at the national or sectoral level that the project seeks to contribute to (ibid.).

Finally, the logframe impact *heading* states 'Increased water security for vulnerable people in Tanzania', whereas both logframe impact indicators relate to improved sector performance – and the outcome *indicator* relates to increased number of people with secure water. For consistency, the evaluation team advise matching the heading of each logframe section with the indicator.

Specific recommendations for updating the logframe are made in Section 5.2, including a proposed revision to the TOC. Repositioning indicators at the right level would help realistic indicators to be selected, which can be used as proxies to track progress within the time-frame of the project. These indicators can then help the programme manager to monitor the progress being made on tangible outputs, as well as on intended localised results and intended sectoral impacts.

[57] See http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/logframe.

3.6 Sustainability and dissemination of project activities

Despite its short duration the project intended to encourage sustainability by building the capacity of local implementing organisations, and by fostering a high level of ownership and engagement by government and other stakeholders (AR 2015).

Box 6. Key findings on the sustainability and dissemination of project activities

- The project was designed so that Mashahidi would be encouraged to continue holding responsible government agencies to account. However, funding shortfalls posed challenges for establishing a support network through which Mashahidi could continue to gain advice and minor financial support after project end. **Mashahidi from four out of the six interviewed communities felt they could have benefited from targeted training to allow them to continue to pursue government agencies alone after project end.**
- **At community level, those water security achievements associated with legal recognition of water rights (WUPs issued, WUA processes strengthened) are highly likely to continue to be protected in future**. However, the unintended water security improvements achieved thanks to awareness-raising by Mashahidi may not be sustained as there is a risk that communities may resume waste dumping in rivers, and may not continue flood-protection measures on fields.
- **At national level, sustaining the momentum gained on improving sector performance faces several challenges**: securing buy-in was challenging as government was unaccustomed to the SAM approach, despite continued efforts by the team to explain the approach to government counterparts. The availability of BWB and NEMC staff also posed a challenge for the functioning of the PAC and for building sustainable relationships with government. Staff turnover within iNGOs also posed challenges for strengthening the advocacy platform on WRM.
- **Strengthening the national NGO *Shahidi wa Maji* was a success for the project and is likely to allow the NGO to continue SAM work in future**. Scaling-up through TAWASANET members was constrained by funding. More practical training is needed in future to allow TAWASANET members to replicate the approach in their areas. High turnover within the project's regional partners (FAN and African Civil Society Network on Water (ANEW) posed potential challenges to sharing the SAM approach in the region and encouraging its uptake elsewhere.
- **To share the approach and lessons-learned of the project, a project handbook was produced and shared at a regional learning event attended by national CSOs and by regional CSO from eight African countries.** Insights were also shared with global practitioners though a variety of webinars and conferences, including at Stockholm World Water Week.

3.6.1 Sustainability of the awareness raised among project communities

A key outcome of the project was raising awareness of WRM issues among Mashahidi. Supporting Mashahidi in each project site was intended to encourage them to continue project activities after project end. The project had not intended to collect monitoring data at project end to check if the knowledge transferred at the start was still being retained, as the primary focus was on how knowledge was being applied and used via APs. However, the evaluation explored this aspect in the communities visited.

Capacity of Mashahidi to continue holding government agencies to account

While all interviewed Mashahidi felt they had gained a better understanding of which risks arose in the case of their water resources and which agencies were responsible for WRM, Mashahidi from four out of the six communities interviewed by the evaluation team felt the knowledge that they had gained was not detailed enough to allow them to pursue responsible government agencies alone, in order to hold them to account.

> *It is true that we are aware [of what the WRM issues are here] and know who to go to [to voice our rights] but we still need support [from the project]. […] We need the project as a pillar. We need an association now to act as a vessel for the work. If there is no-one to assist us to stand for our rights, action may stop.* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere site

> *We fear that a future water problem may happen which we cannot deal with. That will affect our [irrigation] activities and our confidence will fall again.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

> *I need more training on what to write in the letter and why – what do I need to do next if the government does not reply?* – Mashahidi, Ngerengere site

In contrast, a Mashahidi from one community interviewed conveyed her confidence about continuing to engage with responsible agencies, even encouraging neighbouring communities to do the same:

> *I have told other people: what is a WUP and how do you apply for one. I shared this in our farmers meetings; we hold maybe three or four in a year. I paid myself to travel to their villages. I also called some 'town meetings' in my own village – you just ring the big bell and people come to you instead. People here have reacted very well [to the awareness-raising]. The farmers here know that you need a WUP to get a loan [for your irrigation scheme] but most don't know how to apply [for a WUP]. Others have tried but failed. Now I was able to explain to them and they were very happy. Some are thinking of applying themselves now.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site.

Linking Mashahidi through a network or to a WUA

Feedback from project staff suggests that linking Mashahidi through a network or embedding them in a WUA may provide them with the necessary advice and minor financial support needed to continue holding responsible government agencies to account. While the project intended to "*[establish] a network of Mashahidi [to] promote long term impact*" (AR 2014), a workshop to bring together all Mashahidi at project end was beyond the scope of funds available in the project budget.

While the evaluation team do not feel that the project should only work with Mashahidi who are already part of a WUA (see quote below), embedding some Mashahidi within a local institution where suitable – such as a WUA, as is the case in Mkindo or in future catchment committees – could increase the likelihood of sustained outcomes through the institutional support received. However, this approach would only be feasible in sites with a functioning WUA. As explained in Section 3.2.3, the fact that most communities do not yet have functioning WUAs limited the ability of the project to anchor itself within a local WRM institution. Deliberately setting up WUAs would not only have been outside of the project's budget envelope but would have also distorted the institutional context of the project.

> *It is better if the project chooses Mashahidi who are part of a WUA. This will motivate them to keep going [with the awareness-raising]. Local people are very important for spreading knowledge. It is always better to hear a [new] message from your neighbour.* – Head of a BWB

> *The project has raised all of this awareness but now what? It is not sustainable. They should have set up WUAs wherever they work.* – Head of a BWB

Capacity of Mashahidi to act as change agents in project communities

In addition to contacting government agencies responsible for WRM, Mashahidi from two out of the six communities interviewed also raised awareness on water issues in their area through their own initiative and thanks to the skills and financial support which come with their existing role in the community[58]. While this brought about beneficial impacts for some communities (see Section 3.3.2) and contributed to raise the profile the BWB's work, this was not the main intended role of

[58] For example, the Mashahidi of Msimbazi are part of the local government's environment committee; door-to-door awareness raising is already a key part of their work.

Mashahidi[59]. Nonetheless, we briefly set out below the feedback received from communities on their ability to continue raising awareness and to act as change agents in their communities.

Some Mashahidi reported that they lacked the financial resources to hold meetings at village level to share what they had learned: Mashahidi reported that they needed minor funds to cover their transport to the next village where the meeting was to be held, and to cover snacks and drinks provided at meetings – otherwise they felt that community members would not attend. Others flagged that continued engagement by the project would help to sustain awareness within the community. While the project was not intended to entail long-term development work at community level, such feedback helps to better understand the constraints facing Mashahidi.

> *I have tried to use our village assembly to share messages but I am always the last agenda item – it often does not get covered. As a VEC I can also call a meeting in sub-villages just on WRM [only one agenda item] but there are nine sub-villages and we don't have a travel and food allowance to visit communities. Some are far away. Also, people leave the meeting when they realise there won't be any food. We also need posters to help share messages.* – Mashahidi, Mkindo site

> *The education was only shared once [with the cohort]. It needs to be repeated for people to remember. Many of us have forgotten.* – Mashahidi, Mkindo site

> *The project has not come to visit us very often. The last time was six months ago. Not many people here are aware of the work which the project has done. They know we got a WUP but they don't know it was thanks to the project. Eventually we will forget what the project has taught us.* – Mashahidi, Kilombero site

3.6.2 Sustainability of water security improvements achieved in project sites

Those water security achievements associated with legal recognition of water rights are likely to continue protecting water resources from pollution, depletion and competing claims in the future: For example, the water permits secured in two project sites are likely to ensure secure water access into the future, though there is a risk that climate-related shocks to water resource may however affect river flow. Similarly, institutional strengthening of two WUAs thanks to the project is likely to continue to ensure more equitable water allocation in those sites.

However, the unintended water security improvements achieved thanks to the awareness-raising by Mashahidi – namely a reduction in waste dumping in Msimbazi and a reduction in flooding exposure of fields in Mkindo – is dependent on continued engagement by Mashahidi. Given the challenges facing Mashahidi who are aiming to continue awareness-raising, as discussed above, there is a risk that communities may fall back into previous farming practices and waste disposal behaviour[60] once awareness-raising by Mashahidi becomes less frequent: Changing such behaviour takes time and this project was not designed in such a way as to be able to institutionalise such behaviour and to sustain such behaviour change.

3.6.3 Sustainability of momentum gained on improving sector performance

The project took active steps to engage with government at different levels and to encourage their sense of shared ownership of the project, and co-creation of benefits. Involving certain BWB and NEMC staff in direct implementation, as well as in an advisory function via membership of the PAC,

[59] Raising awareness on WRM was only an intended role for Mashahidi in Yaeda, as the project planned for Mashahidi to assess perceptions within the community. No information was available at the time of the evaluation to check the progress on this plan.

[60] Namely, communities may resume dumping waste in the river, and may not continue flood-protection measures for their agricultural fields.

was intended to foster this sense of ownership. This ownership was intended to increase the likelihood of BWBs and NEMC working more closely with communities in future to resolve WRM issues as they were now more aware of the issues faced, and of the importance of their role. Through the awareness raised among the BWB and NEMC staff who had been directly involved in the project it was also hoped that these staff would act as change agents within their departments, ultimately improving the functioning of the sector.

Challenging to manage expectations of the government

As SAM is still a relatively novel approach within the Tanzanian water sector, it was challenging for the project to manage the expectations of the government and to secure buy-in. Due to the significant funding gap in the sector there is a high expectation that NGO projects will contribute funds for direct delivery, whereas this project followed a different model. In order to manage expectations, the project was deliberately designed to include staff from several government agencies both in the core team and on the PAC. Despite continued efforts by the team to explain the approach to government counterparts, some of the government officials interviewed were openly opposed to the approach chosen by the project:

> *It is not good to criticise the efforts of the government. It is important to acknowledge that we have come a long way. It is important that such a project does not contribute to the anger of the communities but uses the little money they have to propose solutions, for example educating people on the risks of using polluted water – and informing NEMC where there is a problem; not waiting for the people to complain.* – Director of Water Resources within the MoWI

> *What the project has taught people is how to complain, not how to comply. [The project] needs to revise their model for operating. They should not be pressuring, they should help us find solutions. For example why has [the project] not been working more closely with the districts? Often it is them who cause delays [in getting WUP applications approved] as we [the BWB] need to wait for their comments.* – Head of a BWB

> *Mkula have been waiting for five years for their permit because they never paid their application fee! They even complained to the minister; he said just pay your fees and then you'll get your permit! If they had followed the proper procedures they would have gotten their WUP faster.* – Head of a BWB

It is possible that the new government that was elected in October 2015 will be more receptive to the social accountability approach of the project due to its political agenda on transparency.

> *This project was dangerous for the former government. The first time the project came to Ngerengere it was chaos for us [at BWB]. But the new president has come with a new approach, he doesn't want to see people suffering because of politics. So now the project will be free to continue their work; nobody will dare to block them.* – Project staff member

As the project approach was novel, spending more time explaining to government counterparts how the project could benefit their work may have increased the likelihood of securing buy-in. Even though the project distributed fliers[61] and regular updates giving an overview of their work, it was not clear to most of the government counterparts interviewed that by increasing the visibility of their work an advocacy project could help secure more funding in the long run – and that an advocacy project could highlight key bottlenecks at policy forums, which would increase the likelihood of these being addressed. While an MOU with the government was drafted, it was not signed by the MoWI because, as one government official explained, '*[the government] cannot have an MOU with a pressure group'.*

[61] Fliers contained details of the project and what it does, and the roles and responsibilities within the project.

This indicates that some members of the government had misunderstood the purpose of the project, which aimed to create a constructive dialogue rather than be a whistleblower.

> *The government think we're humiliating them by highlighting their weaknesses. But we can also be the [BWB's] voice when they are too afraid to tell the Minister the real problems themselves.* – Project core staff member (Shahidi)

Staff availability was a challenge to building sustainable relationships with government

While the project was clearly set up to foster ownership by the government, some challenges were encountered, with three staff dropping out over the course of the project (the DWR staffer seconded to the PAC; an engineer at NEMC; and the Director of Enforcement at NEMC). Reasons included maternity leave and the tragic death of a PAC member. Project staff also reported that some government counterparts were unsatisfied with the low DSA levels provided by the project, though this information could not be verified. These challenges affected the ability of the project team to build the sustainable relationships needed to create a constructive dialogue, and also affected the government's knowledge of the project's activities, as well as the degree of communication across departments about the project's work (AR 2014). Particularly, turnover in the key position of the senior DWR officer representative on the PAC caused challenges for engagement with the DWR. In response, the project team engaged more regularly directly with the Director of Water Resources.

At the BWB level, government counterparts expressed a clear interest in participating in community visits but indicated that in some cases the level of government participation had been low due to lack of planning. In other cases, the low allowances may have been a factor discouraging participation by government in community visits. Where BWB were however able to participate this was a key element in building the awareness and motivation of BWB staff (see Section 3.4.1).

> *It is a great idea for our CDOs to travel together with the project to communities. This way we would have been more aware and involved in the project's activities. However the community visits were not planned together with us. Often we were not even given a week's notice and so we could not join. The project may think we were not interested but it is not true. The visits just need to be scheduled in advance so that we can put it into our staff plan.* – Head of a BWB

> *It is essential that the project visit communities together with one of our BWB staff. Otherwise the messages get confused, e.g. our staff can explain that the BWB Board has not sat in the last six months.* – Head of a BWB

Joined up planning and regular communications needed to foster a sense of ownership

The BWB overseeing the basins where the project operated commented that they did not feel well-informed enough of the project's activities to feel ownership over the process. Even though the project took steps to keep the BWB informed, updates may not have always reached the BWB head, potentially due to issues with internal MoWI communications.

> *I was not aware of which activities the project has implemented in my basin. I only found out when they presented to a big room at a conference. I would have preferred if they had informed me personally.* – Head of a BWB

BWB also felt that if project sites had been selected jointly then the BWB could have ensured that it had funds available to respond to community requests. However, such a design would have arguably distorted the policy environment in which the project operated and would have made the government's response look more favourable than it would have been without any advance notice.

> *We discussed the selection of sites in my basin, but we did not plan the activities themselves together. I wished we would have looked at our priorities together and seen how [the project] could fit in. We need to know what is going on in this basin so that we can put it into our plans. If we know how much the project is spending then we can report it as progress in our plans, as work done through an NGO.* – Head of a BWB

> *The project raises all of these expectations [at community level] but there is no coordination with our plans. You are creating a sense of separation by not planning together. As a result we are not able to respond because we did not plan for activities in that area [e.g. no budget for pollution inspections allocated].* – Head of a BWB

Participation within the PAC was not as high as hoped

Consistent participation by PAC members was not as high as hoped, though project staff reported that those who attended still provided useful advice. While the PAC was originally hoped to meet more regularly, three meetings were held over the lifetime of the project, in order to adjust to the workload of PAC members. PAC members were chosen to include knowledgeable sector stakeholders who could advise on the project's approach and review key outputs. In practice, attendance was not as high as hoped – possibly due to the low allowances policy or perhaps because the aims of the PAC were not clear to all members, as explained by two PAC members. Interviewed government staff felt that feeding specific recommendations from advocacy work into government agencies who were members of the PAC could have been a stronger role of the PAC. The fact that the NEMC director passed away unexpectedly also played a role in regard to coordination with NEMC through the PAC. According to the DWR, the fact that the nominated representative of the NWB only attended one meeting appears to have affected ownership and buy-in by the government. The project adjusted its approach by reporting directly to the Director of Water Resources rather than the nominated DWR representative.

3.6.4 Scaling up the concept across Tanzania

Capacity of the implementing NGO for scaling

WWI deliberately implemented the project though a national NGO, *Shahidi wa Maji*, so that the capacity of a national entity would be built to the extent that it would be able to secure its own funding after project end. The project actively built the staff skills, profile, track record and governance systems of the national NGO to increase its ability to carry out similar initiates in future (AR 2014). This is an important success of the project and is likely to allow *Shahidi wa Maji* to continue SAM work in future. As the NGO only has three staff members, additional staff would need to be hired to allow scale-up. Furthermore, the additional Scottish funding secured under Phase II is allowing the scale up of the approach to new project sites in Rukwa, Pangani, Dar, Kiteto and Mpwapwa.

Funding constraints posed a challenge to scaling up through TAWASANET

The project was deliberately implemented with TAWASANET – the Tanzania network for water and sanitation – as a key partner. Staff from some of the 43 member organisations of TAWASANET were part of the core project team and the TAWASANET Secretariat was a member of the PAC. The project intended for other TAWASANET members to replicate aspects of the project's approach in their areas, and thus increase the evidence base that could be used for advocacy. As TAWASANET members are located all over Tanzania, they are well placed to monitor WRM issues across the country. The project trained the TAWASANET Secretariat on financial management and helped the network adopt progressive policies on equity, diversity and inclusion (AR 2015).

Embedding project activities in an existing NGO network is likely to encourage adoption of a SAM approach by other NGOs in future. However, funding constraints posed a challenge for

TAWASANET members in regard to replicating the approach in their areas, and for the ability of the Secretariat to coordinate activities of its members and draw up an advocacy plan[62]. Additional funding from WaterAid to continue to fund the core services of TAWASANET could not be secured. Only two out of 43 TAWASANET organisations[63] have taken steps to begin implementing the approach to date.

A secondary challenge was transferring the required skills for carrying out a SAM approach to allow TAWASANET members to replicate the approach in their areas. While the five individuals directly involved in the project (three TAWASANET member organisations and two from the Secretariat) have learned how to implement the SAM approach, these practical experiences have not yet been shared with the rest of TAWASANET. A workshop was held for TAWASANET members in March 2014 to give them an introduction to the SAM approach, but given that most members work on water supply instead of WRM, more practical training will be needed in future (see recommendations in Section 5.2).

> *There was an assumption that generating interest in the social accountability approach among TAWASANET members was enough for them to scale up our work spontaneously. We should have chosen a small number of TAWASANET members from the start with whom to implement jointly. That way they would have learned by doing.* – Project core staff member (Shahidi)

> *Water CSOs are very weak in Tanzania. Sustainable capacity building is a challenge as capable staff often leave after they have been trained up*. – NGO actor

Some challenges in bolstering the advocacy platform through iNGOs membership

The project intended to create an advocacy platform, designed to bring together the CSO members of TAWASANET and the iNGOs working on WRM to increase the civil society voice on WRM in Tanzania and reduce fragmentation in the sector. A clear success for the project was drawing up an MOU between Shahidi and TAWASANET in order to allow Shahidi to represent the network on WRM issues. This was an important step for gaining credibility at JWSR meetings.

However, the project faced challenges in strengthening TAWASANET through encouraging iNGOs to join the existing network. An initial meeting was held where interest from iNGOs in collaborating was agreed, with the intention to meet quarterly. However, while agreement was reached on how to share plans and combine activities for SAM, these commitments have not yet been fulfilled, in part due to staff turn-over within iNGOs. Engaging with partners put a drain on project resources as relationships had to be re-launched every time there was staff turnover within the iNGOs and CSOs (AR 2015). Strengthening this iNGO support for the civil society voice will be important for continuing to hold responsible government agencies to account in future. WWI is continuing efforts to secure interest from WWF, and from others through the Agenda for Change initiative (with WaterAid, Water for People and UNICEF).

3.6.5 Likelihood of uptake of the concept in neighbouring countries

One intended project outcome was increased likelihood of SAM approaches being used in other countries. This likelihood depends on the extent to which the project shared lessons and held training sessions to build capacity on the methodology for SAM projects. While there have been successful examples of uptake of the approach in Kenya and Zambia, the likelihood of uptake was largely constrained by lack of funds on the part of partners to implement the approach elsewhere.

[62] The Secretariat only comprises two staff members; additional staff would have to be hired.
[63] The organisations are ACRA (in Iringa) and Mzabi (in Ikafara)

Engaging with regional partners has been challenging

The project was originally set up to work closely with two regional networks on water: FAN and ANEW. However, a key challenge with regard to sharing lessons through these networks has been the termination of core funding to both networks in 2014 (AR 2014). As a result, the project engaged directly with FAN regional networks in South Asia, Central America, Mexico and South America, and directly with the member organisations of ANEW. Limited capacity[64] of the networks may have limited the extent of lesson-sharing. Limited project funds may also have affected the extent of outreach.

The project shared its methodology and lessons learnt with ANEW through a 2016 workshop attended by ANEW members from eight countries[65], and via reports. A webinar in March 2016 for FAN-South America also shared details of the approach and learning internationally. The workshops were used to share important lessons from the project and to build the skills of participants by drawing up implementation plans in selected countries through a participatory approach.

Example of replication in other countries

Replication has largely been constrained by the availability of funds. A key success has been securing Scottish funding to allow WWI to replicate and adapt the project concept in Zambia. In addition, the ANEW partner in Kenya (KEWASANET) has been able to secure funding to analyse budget and expenditure flows on water in Nairobi, as a result of skills learned from participating in the project's budget workshop. WWI has submitted funding applications jointly with national NGOs to replicate the project concept in Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda, but these have not yet been successful. Additional funding opportunities are also being pursued with other donors.

> *We have been able to analyse our national and county budgets with a view to establishing the commitment of the governments in terms of resource allocation towards water supply, conservation, management and embracing a human rights based approach to water and sanitation.* – Member of KEWASANET

3.6.6 Disseminating learning within the international water sector

Responses received from international outreach could have been better documented

The project's SAM methodology and key lessons were shared at a wide variety of international events in 2013, 2014 and 2015. These included presentations at Stockholm World Water Week, UK Water Forum, Water Integrity Forum, World Water Congress, at research events in the UK, and through a presentation made to the IWMI in Sri Lanka. While these presentations provided an opportunity to demonstrate the use of the social accountability approach for WRM, the project could have benefited from better documenting the response received – for example through a feedback form – to better understand how effective the outreach had been in each case. While the response received was well-documented for workshops, this posed more challenging for larger conferences. Anecdotally, Transparency International in Bangladesh and the IWMI-Nepal have shown an interest in replicating the approach in their countries.

[64] As the ANEW Secretariat was rebooted in 2016 it provides a new opportunity for engaging with the network in future.
[65] The countries were Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

4 Conclusions

4.1 Summary of achievements against evaluation questions

The overall purpose of the evaluation was to provide a comprehensive understanding of what has been achieved by the project, and to unpick the conditions which have contributed to the successes and challenges of the project. Below we provide conclusions regarding the project's achievements, key challenges and shortcomings. Recommendations based on these conclusions are set out in Section 5.

Overall, the project implemented the majority of its planned activities by project end. Some outstanding advocacy work and community activities in two project sites that were suspended will be carried out in mid-2016 with the additional funds secured from the Scottish Government. The project used its limited funds efficiently.

Considerable progress was made towards securing water resources at community level and towards raising the voice of water users and the profile of WRM within the sector, as a result of sustained efforts by the project team in-country. Few people would have predicted in 2013 that such a short-term advocacy project would have been able to stimulate tangible improvements in water security within only three years, and the efforts that have been put in to achieve these results must be commended.

Relevance of the approach

The project's concept is highly relevant to the Tanzanian water sector, which currently faces multiple challenges in delivering water security: Due to increasing and competing water demands and ineffective WRM, there is a risk that water users with a less powerful voice will receive less equitable access to, or legal protection of, the water resources they need for health, livelihoods and economic development. As a result, the choice of a SAM framework is an appropriate design for raising the voice of less powerful water users. Therefore the project's choice of focusing its community work on small community-level water users who have a weaker voice on water is highly relevant. The project intended to raise the voice of these marginalised water users by increasing their capability to express their views and to demand their rights and entitlements, and by doing so to contribute to a more equitable WRM. Project sites were selected that were well suited for such advocacy purposes. The project was designed in such a way that if the government was responsive to the demands of small-scale community-level users, this would improve water security for project communities in the immediate future. If not, the project could use their lack of response as an evidence base for advocacy work, along with insights from other sector analysis undertaken by the project.

Effectiveness and impact of community-level activities

- **Community activities were successfully completed across eight sites.** Activities in the two remaining sites were suspended until Phase II. Given the novelty of applying SAM approaches to the water sector in Tanzania, **iterative lesson-learning and adjustment by the project team was key,** and took place based on feedback from communities and project staff.
- **The participatory action research approach chosen with communities was highly effective in raising the awareness needed among Mashahidi to get the APs implemented.** Mashahidi expressed an improved capacity to express their views and demand their rights.

- **While some agreed APs took longer to be implemented, the majority (87%) were implemented across eight project sites by project end**. The tight time-frame, limited funds and limited staffing of the project posed minor challenges for the implementation of community-level work. Some Mashahidi reported that more frequent visits by project staff would have allowed APs to be implemented more quickly, and would have improved and maintained their motivation. The budget allowed most project sites to be visited three to four times during the three-year project.

- Achieving positive impacts for the water security of affected communities was an ambitious objective within the three-year time-frame. Nonetheless, the project contributed to positive impacts in many communities. Positive impacts were more likely where the response to an AP was more within the control of the project or community, or where the solutions were within relatively easy reach of responsible authorities. **Overall, the project directly contributed towards increased water security for 159,000 people**. In the two project sites where WUPs were secured, communities felt that thanks to having a more secure water supply they were able to have more reliable agricultural yields. One irrigation scheme was able to use their WUP as collateral to secure a financial loan. However, the unintended water security improvements achieved thanks to awareness-raising by Mashahidi may not be sustained as there is a risk that communities may resume waste dumping in rivers, and may not continue flood-protection measures for their agricultural fields.

- **A key challenge was securing a favourable response from relevant government authorities on WUP application and on pollution control within the project time-frame**. Twelve out of 18 WUP applications (relating to two project sites) and one out of three sites saw enforcement action on pollution by responsible authorities.

- **It was challenging to manage expectations at community level in some project sites, where the project was not able to facilitate a resolution to their water issues within the project time-frame.** Some Mashahidi who did not receive a favourable response to their AP request intended to pursue a more confrontational approach. In two sites affected by pollution, Mashahidi for example intended to contact the media. Confrontational approaches could jeopardising the project's constructive advocacy approach with the government but so far **no evidence of negative impacts was found**, such as reprisals as a result of advocacy work.

Table 7. Summary of risks to effectiveness, impact and sustainability of community activities

Risk	Mitigation efforts undertaken	Residual effects
Funding shortfalls could constrain the ability of the project to engage with Mashahidi and communities sufficiently enough	Some sites were dropped to prioritise resources on a smaller number of sites (scale-back). Contact was maintained through regular phone calls, where the budget was not sufficient to fund frequent community visits	**Medium** – Infrequent visits may have affected motivation of Mashahidi in some areas. Funding shortfalls also posed challenges for establishing a support network through which Mashahidi could continue to activities after project end
Mashahidi may lack motivation, as their priority concerns may lie elsewhere, with WRM issues seen as marginal concerns	Initial mapping of water issues to assess priorities; setting out expectations and roles; refining of the approach to re-engage Mashahidi through feedback received	**Low** – Only nine out of 37 Mashahidi became less active over the project lifecycle
Mashahidi may lack the financial resources needed to implement APs	This was addressed by the project covering minor expenses	**Low** – though it resulted in some delays in implementation of APs

Project staff may lack the skills to effectively transfer knowledge on WRM legislation to communities (see Section 3.6.1)	All project staff used the project's review of WRM legislation as their reference document, which was checked for accuracy by the PAC	**Low** – Any APs involving technical knowledge (e.g. application for a WUP) were delivered with focused support from the project staff
Risk of unwillingness by communities to pay for water permit application fee and annual fee	Detailed sessions with communities to explain the importance of WUPs	**Low** – Only in one community were the fees for a domestic WUP perceived as unaffordable
Supporting new applications for water permits could overwhelm limited capacity and procedures of BWB, resulting in delayed or unfavourable responses to the requests of Mashahidi	Including staff from responsible agencies both on the core team and in the PAC to ensure they are well-informed about project activities	**Medium** – It was a challenge to secure a favourable response from relevant government authorities on WUP application and on pollution control within the project time-frame

Effectiveness and impact of national advocacy work

- The advocacy strategy was designed mid-way through the project: it was deliberately phased so that it could be informed by insights from the community-level work. **Most advocacy activities were completed at the time of the evaluation.** The political climate around the October 2015 presidential elections posed some challenges, and caused some delays, for advocacy work: for example, TV spots and radio dramas could only be aired in February 2016.
- **Four national 'learning-by-doing' workshops with government and other sector stakeholders were successful in raising awareness amongst attendees**. Of the 110 individuals who attended, 76% reported newly acquired capability and intent to apply the knowledge gained. Furthermore, involving BWB and NEMC staff directly in the implementation of community-level project activities also provided the unintended benefits of enhanced workplace motivation amongst staff. However, the technical policy briefs detailing how recommendations from the advocacy work could be implemented were not yet completed at the time of the evaluation, which may have limited the project's impact on sector performance to date.
- **The project generated important insights into the specific challenges relating to WRM processes, and showcased the impacts this is having on communities using insights from case studies. These were communicated to government, donors and the public.** The presentations at the Joint Water Sector Review (JWSR) in 2014 and 2015 were particularly effective. Being able to present findings at the JWSR on behalf of the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (TAWASANET), which has a formal role in the sector dialogue mechanism, strengthened the weight of the messages delivered. However, availability of BWB and NEMC staff and staff turnover within donors posed some challenge in regard to sector engagement.
- **Analysis undertaken by the project in 2014 clearly highlighted staffing and funding shortfalls facing BWBs,** allowing the project to advocate for increased budget allocation to the BWBs. However, limited project funds posed some challenges in regard to the depth and quality of the analysis in 2014.
- **The project's full contribution is not yet visible in some logframe indicators at impact and outcome level. Advocacy work often requires long-term engagement to embed and sustain impacts, which posed challenges in setting impact-level indicators for advocacy work, given the extensive contextual factors affecting sector performance.** However, the technical policy briefs detailing how recommendations from the advocacy work could be implemented were not yet completed at the time of the evaluation, which may have limited the project's impact on sector performance to date. While a four-fold increase in donor funding to WRM was seen over the lifetime of the project, interviewed donors reported that these investments were made independently of the project. However, the advocacy work

planned for mid-2016 with funding levered by this initial UK Aid Direct investment is likely to contribute to increased funding allocations to WRM in future.

Table 8. Summary of risks to the effectiveness, impacts and sustainability of advocacy work

Risk	Mitigation efforts undertaken	Residual effects
Funding shortfalls could constrain the extent and depth of advocacy work, thus affecting effectiveness.	Given limited project funds, advocacy channels were prioritised that were expected to be most likely to have impact.	**Medium** – Some advocacy work was delayed until mid-2016 due to funding shortfalls. Limited project funds also posed challenges in regard to the depth and frequency of budget and expenditure.
The methodology used in workshops could be ineffective for raising awareness and transferring skills.	The PAC advised on the advocacy strategy, which was piloted and updated using feedback from participants.	**Low** – Effective for raising awareness; only some participants mentioned that workshop content could have been more tailored.
Political climate during the 2015 elections could hamper the ability to carry out advocacy activities.	Advocacy work was delayed and additional funding was secured to carry out activities after March 2016.	**Low** – Advocacy work was delayed for six months.
Not being able to access sufficiently detailed financial data could constrain a meaningful and accurate analysis of financial flows within the sector.	Efforts to access data through the NWB; advice sought from other budget tracking experts in Tanzania; and the Open Government Initiative was used where possible.	**Medium** – Funding constraints and the new 2015 'cyber law' posed challenges for the depth and frequency of budget and expenditure.
Advocacy messages may not be tailored adequately to their intended audiences.	Advice sought from expert practitioners.	**Low** – for messages aimed at government. *Too early to tell, for messages aimed at the public and at parliament.*
Advocacy work may not be well received by government.	MOU proposed with DWR; project staff trained on delivery of 'constructive advocacy'; government engaged through the PAC.	**Low** – The project understood the sensitive nature of the budget analysis and shared findings only with the MoWI. However, some government counterparts did not feel sufficient ownership over the process to sustain the momentum gained on improving the sector.
Advocacy work may not generate impacts for sector performance due to the long-term engagement that is often needed to embed and sustain impacts.	The project was well aware of the challenge of influencing sector performance within the short project time-frame. Key advocacy messages were specifically targeted at the JWSR, which provides a mechanism for holding the government and donors to account for sector investments.	**Medium** – The project has not yet sufficiently contributed to the strengthening of sector processes for this to increase permit issuance and conflict resolution at a national level. However, the outstanding advocacy work planned for mid-2016 is likely to contribute to increased funding allocations to WRM in future.
The capacity of national project partners and regional networks may limit the replication of the SAM approach elsewhere.	The project organised workshops to explain the steps and challenges of the SAM approach to national project partners and regional networks.	**Medium** – National CSO networks and regional networks project were financially constrained in their ability to scale up the SAM approach in their regions.

Efficiency of project implementation

- **Project activities were delivered on budget. The project experienced only minor delays**, due to turnover of the project manager position and the political climate during the 2015 elections. This resulted in a no-cost extension of three months. Project activities are being extended until October 2016 and scaled to a wider geography, with additional funds secured from the Scottish Government.

- **The project used its limited resources efficiently thanks to tight financial management.** Varied skillsets and strong existing sectoral knowledge and networks of staff were key success factors. Community-level activities were delivered at a lower cost than planned (£0.79 per person, compared to £1.00). However the limited funding and related limited staffing posed challenges for engagement with communities and project partners. Some additional funds were also leveraged from iWASH.

- The internal monitoring information collected by the project could have been more clearly presented, to inform project oversight and management. For example, the fact that baseline information in project sites as not presented in line with the logframe indicators (e.g. knowledge/awareness levels; number of permits in place; reported conflicts) made it more challenging to systematically demonstrate the changes achieved in project sites.

Sustainability and dissemination of project activities

- The project was designed so that Mashahidi would be encouraged to continue holding responsible government agencies to account. However, funding shortfalls posed challenges for establishing a support network through which Mashahidi could continue to gain advice and minor financial support after project end. **Mashahidi from four out of the six interviewed communities felt they could have benefited from targeted training to allow them to continue to pursue government agencies alone after project end.**

- At community level, those water security achievements associated with legal recognition of water rights (WUPs issued, WUA processes strengthened) are highly likely to continue to be protected in future. However, the unintended water security improvements achieved thanks to awareness-raising by Mashahidi may not be sustained as there is a risk that communities may resume waste dumping in rivers, and may not continue flood-protection measures for their agricultural fields.

- **At national level, sustaining the momentum gained on improving sector performance faces several challenges**: securing buy-in was challenging as government was unaccustomed to the SAM approach, despite continued efforts by the team to explain the approach to government counterparts. The availability of BWB and NEMC staff also posed a challenge for the functioning of the PAC and for building sustainable relationships with government. Staff turnover within iNGOs also posed challenges for strengthening the advocacy platform on WRM.

- Strengthening the national NGO *Shahidi wa Maji* was a success for the project and is likely to allow the NGO to continue SAM work in future. Scaling-up through TAWASANET members was constrained by funding. More practical training is needed in future to allow TAWASANET members to replicate the approach in their areas. High turnover within the project's regional partners (FAN and African Civil Society Network on Water (ANEW) posed potential challenges to sharing the SAM approach in the region and encouraging its uptake elsewhere.

- To share the approach and lessons-learned of the project, a project handbook was produced and shared at a regional learning event attended by national CSOs and by regional CSO from

eight African countries. Insights were also shared with global practitioners though a variety of webinars and conferences, including at Stockholm World Water Week.

4.2 Summary of achievements against rationale for GPAF funding

The GPAF Innovation Grant targeted projects 'focused on bringing tangible change to poor people's lives through raising household income and improving livelihoods', favouring 'innovative approaches considered suitable for scale up'[66].

The project succeeded in bringing about tangible change at community level for those communities where a favourable response to the actions carried out by Mashahidiv was received. The main impacts seen were a more secure water supply, thanks to issued WUPs, improved water quality in rivers, due to reduced pollution, reduced exposure to flooding, and more equitable WRM, due to the strengthening of local water management bodies (WUAs).

GPAF funding helped pilot an innovative approach to increasing the voice of marginalised communities, as SAM has not been used within the WRM sector in Tanzania. While the approach is suitable for scaling, it requires additional local partners with high capacity and longer-term funding to increase the likelihood of sustained change within the sector.

Social accountability projects such as the Uhakika are best suited to longer-term funding and implementation given the complexity of their intended outcomes.

4.3 Overall impact and value for money

Overall, the project directly contributed towards increased water security for 159,000 people and towards raising the profile of WRM within and outside of the water sector. Community-level activities were able to be delivered at a lower cost than planned (£0.79 per person, compared to the budgeted £1.00 per person) thanks to a large number of community members benefiting, when the security of access to a water source was improved or when steps were taken to protect a water source. Nonetheless, the project could have more clearly stated its assumptions regarding the populations benefiting from project activities (see Section 3.5.4).

[66] From: www.gov.uk/guidance/global-poverty-action-fund-gpaf.

5 Recommendations

The recommendations below have been separated out into recommendations for the project team (for immediate action and in the longer term) and for other stakeholders wanting to promote and adopt a SAM approach in future.

5.1 Project-level recommendations for immediate action

The bullet points below set out key recommendations for immediate action by the project team (within six months), along-side the completion of the outstanding advocacy activities (the outreach work planned with MPs and the production of technical policy briefs).

1. **Draw together policy guidance targeted at the upcoming water legislation reform.** The project is planning to engage directly with MPs and to produce technical policy briefs over the coming months. The evaluation team feel that these activities are very timely, given that the Tanzanian government has recently begun plans to make amendments to its water legislation. *Shahidi wa Maji* is well placed to lead the CSO voice and to draw together detailed guidance for policy reform, based on the experiences of this project. For example, detailed guidance notes could be drawn up on risk-based permitting or streamlining responsibilities of WUAs.

2. **Update case study bulletins to capture in detail the impacts achieved in each site.** Given the novelty of applying social accountability approaches to the water sector in Tanzania, it is important for the project to capture in detail the impacts achieved in each site to demonstrate to others the value of the approach. The project has produced two-page case study bulletins for most project sites, which provide a helpful overview of risks faced in each site and how responsible agencies should act to address these. However, a similarly succinct summary of the impacts achieved in each site has not yet been produced. While the evaluation investigated impacts in the six communities visited (four project sites), additional information for the remaining project sites will have to be collected the project team. Investigating these and presenting them side-by-side with the baseline information gained in the first site visit would provide a powerful way of communicating what impacts have been achieved. Annex B.2 provides examples of how the impacts achieved could be presented alongside the activities undertaken to demonstrate to others how impacts where achieved in different sites.

3. **Capture practical lessons from project implementation and management.** A wealth of lessons have been learned by the project team on how to carry out SAM though Mashahidi and how to use insights gained as evidence for constructive advocacy work with government. A handbook has been drafted by WWI that provides useful guidance on implementing the eight key steps of the project cycle, and a workshop was held in February 2016 to explain the approach to CSOs from several African countries. The evaluation team feel that the handbook could be strengthened by the addition of practical insights learned through the team's experiences (examples below). Summarising the rich insights of the team will ensure learning is captured before any staff turnover at project end and will provide important learning for organisations hoping to replicate the approach in future:

    - How does one proceed if the community members who volunteer to become Mashahidi are all members of government? What risks would this pose?
    - How does one proceed if the community members who volunteer to become Mashahidi are all male?
    - How does one proceed if Mashahidi become less active over the course of the programme and APs are not being implemented?
    - What advice can be given to Mashahidi if they have not received a reply from responsible authorities, after numerous letters have been written?

- What advice can be given for structuring an advocacy workshop where both members of civil society and government are attending – i.e. both the giving and receiving end of advocacy work?
- What different options are there for ensuring that the community work of a SAM programme is planned in a joined up way with local government and BWB to ensure their ownership over the process, but still allowing the programme to maintain its independence?
- What different options are there for sharing the findings from a potentially sensitive budget and expenditure analysis with government, in order to maintain a constructive relationship with them?

5.2 Project-level recommendations for the longer term

These recommendations apply to WWI's future work on SAM in Tanzania, as well as replications of the approach in Zambia and elsewhere:

4. **Draw up a detailed TOC to more clearly illustrate and communicate the design of the project.** The project's objectives, outputs, outcomes and desired impacts are set out in the logframe and accompanying documentation. Setting these out in a TOC format would help to more clearly illustrate the causal links and assumptions underlying project design to an external audience. While a TOC was drawn up as part of this evaluation to match the intentions set out in the logframe, proposed revisions are set out in Annex B.1 which better match the causal links uncovered over the course of the evaluation.

5. **At design stage, the political risks to project delivery should be more thoroughly assessed and accompanied by appropriate mitigation plans.** Based on the challenges experienced by this project as a result of the 2015 presidential elections, it is recommended to assess when and where community access may be restricted during periods of political disruption, such as elections, and to put in place a plan for how community work can be continued under these circumstances. Legal advice could be sought to clarify any legal limits on the use and publishing of data.

6. **At design stage, ensure sufficient resourcing for on-going liaison and joint planning with government and donors, to ensure that insights from advocacy work inform the government capacity-building work of other donors.** It is important that advocacy messages not only highlight the challenges facing effective WRM and Tanzania, but also include clear solutions and recommendations, clearly communicated to donors, for example during Technical Sector Working Group meetings. Engaging more with the 'supply side' of accountability could strengthen the impact of the project's advocacy work.

7. **Secure sufficient funding for recruiting and retaining a large enough team of adequately experienced staff** to support more effective government, community and partner engagement. Such staffing would also allow government performance to be tracked more regularly, through annual budget and expenditure analysis. In Uhakika limited project funds permitted only two full-time equivalents as staff members. At least five staff are recommended to adequately implement a SAM project like Uhakika: At least two staff are needed to allow the project to engage with communities regularly enough to sustain their engagement. If these cannot be funded, it is recommended to focus on fewer sites, to allow a more in-depth engagement. In addition, more staff are needed to manage the project. The project manager requires the support of at least one deputy, as well as a finance officer and an advocacy officer responsible for coordinating all advocacy and dissemination work. The project manager and the advocacy officer in particular require in-depth knowledge of the sector so that the advocacy work can take advantage of opportunities which arise for influencing the sector.

8. **Provide additional training and adequate resources and time to support monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and learning.** Whilst the team worked hard to capture data and lessons, there was not always adequate space, time and resources to reflect as a group and to adapt project delivery accordingly. Dedicated external or internal monitoring, evaluation and learning support should be considered.
    - **Training for project staff on M&E techniques** could include how to capture baseline information in line with the logframe indicators, and how to systematically record quotes from community members on potential impacts. Training on process tracing or 'most significant change' approaches would allow staff to investigate and demonstrate the linkages between project activities and reported impacts. Such an approach would allow project staff to compare the effectiveness of different advocacy channels, and adjust project implementation based on this learning. In a wider sense, more robust M&E would allow the project to better demonstrate to others the benefits gained thanks to the project.
    - **Tracking long-term changes in water quality:** Given that this is a key impact at community level, it would be valuable for the project team to explore the funds needed to allow long-term monitoring of water quality at project sites affected by pollution.
    - **Shorter reporting templates are recommended**, summarising what was done in each community visit, progress on the AP, the impressions of community members on impacts thanks to the project, and a section for recording operational lessons on what did or did not go well.
9. **Provide more structured support and advice for Mashahidi:**
    - When initiating community wok, it is **recommended to discuss the underlying motivations of each Mashahidi and the time they have available for their role**. This is expected to improve the likelihood of implementation of AP, as Mashahidi are an essential element for the project implementation at community level.
    - **Holding annual workshops for all Mashahidi:** Bringing all Mashahidi together at a workshop at project start and annually thereafter would allow Mashahidi to be linked through a network, which they can use as a resource to obtain advice from other Mashahidi on certain practical challenges faced. Workshops could cover topics such as how to proceed when no response has been received from responsible government agencies. Establishing such a network will increase the likelihood of Mashahidi continuing to engage with responsible agencies in future. Additional training for project staff on WRM policies could also improve the quality of the training given to communities.
    - **Establish a clear escalation policy** for Mashahidi on the actions communities can undertake when no response has been received from responsible government
10. **The evaluation team recommend designing advocacy work to take place in parallel to community work** so that advocacy work can begin earlier, given the long time-frame needed to see impacts on sector performance. Currently, the project's advocacy work relies on insights from community activities, which take at least a year to be implemented. However additional advocacy work could begin earlier, based on sectoral challenges highlighted in other secondary studies or known to the government counterparts who are members of the project's core team. In addition, some APs are implemented more quickly than others, allowing advocacy messages to be drawn up iteratively.
11. **Sufficient funding should be secured to allow government performance to be tracked more regularly**, in order to increase the impact of advocacy work on sector performance. With additional funds, the project would be able to carry our additional disaggregated analysis in future, which could strengthen the evidence behind certain advocacy messages. For example, comparing the cost of setting up a WUA[67] across different basins could provide insights into the

[67] The analysis undertaken did include information on the overall funds spent on WUA set-ups in each basin, but the data were not disaggregated so as to compare the cost of setting up one WUA across different basins.

funding gap needed to achieve national WUA targets. Similarly, the number of BWB staff per basin could be presented in relation to the geographical size of the basin, or to the size of the population served, to strengthen the advocacy message on staffing shortfalls.

12. **Sufficient funding should be secured to allow a greater number of TAWASANET partners to be involved in direct project delivery,** to increase the likelihood of other organisations scaling the approach in other regions of Tanzania. The experience of the project suggests that the knowledge and skills to undertake SAM work were most effectively built in those individual TAWASANET members who were directly involved in the project as core team members. Sharing such rich insights with the rest of TAWASANET through workshops can be a challenge. Carefully selecting one or two members of TAWASANET to manage project delivery in different sites in Tanzania would instead allow these partners to learn by doing, and would increase the likelihood of their scaling up the approach in their other intervention areas, if additional funding is secured. In order to facilitate the management of these partnerships, the experience of the current project shows the importance of clearly stating the roles of each partner, setting out the risks facing partnership arrangements, and identifying mitigating strategies.

13. **Continue efforts to explain how the project could benefit the government's work during project implementation.** This recommendation was made by government counterparts who were interviewed and is likely to improve their buy-in: government counterparts should have a good understanding of what the project involves, ahead of any commitment to collaborate. The challenges of staff turnover could be overcome by ensuring that a new replacement is quickly found to replace any seconded government staff who are no longer able to take part in the project.

Table 9. Examples of monitoring indicators that could be used in future SAM projects in the WRM sector

Result	Indicator	Data source
Output level		
Guidance produced to address bottlenecks within the sector	Number of technical guidance notes produced	Internal monitoring data
	Number of technical presentations held at BWB meetings	Internal monitoring data
Increased voice of Mashahidi on water resource rights	Perceived change in voice over water rights, compared to project start	Qualitative views gathered from Mashahidi by the project team
Outcome level		
Increased ownership by government over resolving WRM issues	Number of BWB staff participating in community visits of the project	Internal monitoring data
Impact level		
Profile of WRM raised within the sector	Number of times WRM issues are mentioned in parliament	Minutes of parliamentary debates

5.3 National policy-level lessons

14. Given the beneficial results seen from this project, both at community-level and at national level, and the regional and global interest expressed in the approach, **it is recommended that social accountability work within the WRM sector be continued and strengthened**. The project has shown the importance of having a civil society voice on WRM which can hold the sector to account for its commitments under the WSDP, and to provide feedback on service provision to responsible agencies.

15. **It is recommended that a higher level of longer-term funding be made available to fund social accountability work.** Long-term and iterative engagement is needed to influence policy processes. It takes time to adjust legal and regulatory processes based on recommendations made. The funds available via GPAF were too short-term to secure the full potential benefits of SAM for equitable WRM. A proportion of national WSDP funds could be allocated to funding long-term accountability work.

16. **Donors involved in the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP) should collaborate more closely with social accountability initiatives** by sharing data on commitments and disbursements made and by engaging with the recommendations coming out of social accountability work, for example through Phase II of DFID's Accountability in Tanzania Programme (ACT II).

17. **To allow the approach to be adjusted for use in other countries, it is recommended to carry out detailed political economy analysis, and assessments of partner needs and capability** prior to designing the approach in each country, to ensure that the design reflects the sectoral context of the country. The project has highlighted the importance of adopting a context-specific approach to advocacy to ensure that advocacy work is based on appropriate consideration of relevant issues, provides relevant solutions and is delivered through effective advocacy channels.

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Annex A Background on the evaluation methodology

A.1 Terms of Reference

1.1 Background information

DFID provides significant funding to civil society organisations (CSOs) annually in line with its overall strategy to alleviate poverty and promote peace, stability and good governance. The Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPA) and Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) are two of DFID's principal funding mechanisms and have provided £480 million to approximately 230 CSOs between 2011 and 2013. The current political climate and results-based agenda demand a rigorous assessment of the effectiveness of funds disbursed to ensure that they are managed to provide value for money.

1.2 Invitation to conduct a final evaluation

Water Witness International is inviting a suitably experienced consultant(s) to tender for the final evaluation of its Fair Water Futures (Phase 1) Project in Tanzania which is funded by DFID's Global Poverty Action Fund Innovation Grant. Fair Water Futures (known as Uhakika wa Maji in Tanzania) is an innovative two and a half year project which pioneers the systematic application of social accountability monitoring to deliver improved performance of water resource management institutions and water security for 240 000 vulnerable people. The project works with communities to activate water law and institutions across seven case study sites in Tanzania, using responses and the results of a sector wide budget and resource analysis to generate and target constructive advocacy.

The successful team will bring an appropriate mix of international and regional/contextual and technical expertise with understanding of M&E and civil society / social accountability. The objectives of the assignment are to independently verify the performance of the project, assess its cost effectiveness and value for money and to generate learning about the sustainability and scalability of the approach.

As per these Terms of Reference the team is expected to spend ten - 12 days in Tanzania in late November / early December 2015 to conduct meetings, key informant interviews, visit case study sites and attend a project learning event. Outputs will include a comprehensive M&E report and outward facing Executive Summary. The available budget for the assignment is £11 500 and interested parties should submit a separate financial and technical proposal by 25th September.

1.3 Purpose of the independent final evaluation for GPAF grantees

The independent final evaluation reports that are submitted by grantees will be used to inform the Fund Manager's understanding of the grantee's performance at the project level and will also be used to inform the Evaluation Manager's assessment of performance at the GPAF fund level.

The independent final evaluation report needs to be a substantial document that (a) answers all the elements of the Terms of Reference (ToR); (b) provides findings and conclusions that are based on robust and transparent evidence; and (c) where necessary supplements the grantee's own data with independent research.

1.4 Key objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation has three explicit objectives that are explained below:

1. To independently verify (and supplement where necessary), grantees' record of achievement as reported through its Annual Reports and defined in the project logframe (see section 1.6 below)
2. To assess the extent to which the project was good value for money, which includes considering: See section 1.7 below).
    - How well the project met its objectives;
    - How well the project performed in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and learning in relation to delivery of its outcome;
    - What has happened because of DFID funding that wouldn't have otherwise happened; and
    - How well the project aligns with DFID's goals of supporting the delivery of the MDGs.
3. To evaluate the degree to which social accountability monitoring and the 'Uhakika' approach can contribute to equitable growth, water security and climate resilience, highlighting the following: (See section 1. 8)
    - The most successful aspects of the approach and 'most significant changes' achieved;
    - Particular challenges faced by the project and approach;
    - What are the likely impacts beyond the timeline of the project, how sustainable is the approach and can it be scaled?
    - The factors contributing to these success and challenges and lessons which can be applied in Tanzania and globally to maximise the contribution of social accountability to equitable water management in the future.

1.5 Verification of grantee reporting

The first task of the final evaluation is to verify grantee achievement. This means to assess whether the record of achievement claimed by FWF is valid and accurate. The record of achievement will be presented in past Annual Reports and progress against the project logframe. This exercise could include verifying information that was collected by the grantee for reporting purposes and possibly supplementing this data will additional information collected through primary and secondary research.

Verifying the results from the project log frame will begin to capture what the project has achieved. However, there will be other activities and results that occur outside of the logframe that may require examination in order to respond to the different evaluation questions. Verifying reporting will also necessarily include a review of the data and systems that were used to populate results.

1.6 Assessment of value for money

Each final evaluation should assess the extent to which the delivery and results of the project are good value for money. Value for money can be defined in different ways, but at minimum the evaluation report should include an assessment against:

- How well the project applied value for money principles of effectiveness, economy, efficiency in relation to delivery of its outcome;
- What has happened because of DFID funding that wouldn't have otherwise happened.

A.2 Detail on the theory-based approach

Overview of step-by-step process

While there are several different frameworks[68] which can be used for evaluations, we chose a theory-based approach as such an approach allows WWI (and GPAF / DFID) to understand how Uhakika progressed against what was planned. Theory-based evaluations take a project's TOC as the starting point for the evaluation design. We used this overarching approach and followed the step-by-step process set out below:[69]

1. First, **the project's TOC was discussed with project staff** to better understand the assumptions that were made when drawing up the causal mechanisms expected to operate under this TOC. Discussions also covered which stakeholders were involved in the project and which activities each carries out, and **how these activities relate to the outputs proposed (also known as 'process mapping')**. This step made it possible to establish a clear picture of what each implementing partner intended to achieve at project design, and by which processes and activities this was intended to be achieved. This formed a basis for comparison for the evaluation, which checked what was achieved against these intentions. This made it possible to **check the validity and completeness of the TOC** – a crucial step in assessing how to Uhakika intended to contribute to equitable growth, water security and climate resilience, for example. Through this process **revisions to the TOC were also proposed**, to more clearly articulate what the project intended to achieve.

2. Next, **the evaluation questions were revisited,** prioritising them and proposing a **set of evaluation tools** to answer these. This process was carried out in close collaboration with WWI, to ensure that the prioritisation matched what they aimed to achieve with the evaluation.

3. T**he scope of the evaluation was defined** together with WWI and robust methodologies were developed to answer the evaluation questions.

4. Finally, a **mix of primary and secondary data were used to answer the evaluation questions**. It was important to build on existing secondary data – e.g. annual reports and case study and workshop findings – due to the limited time available for the evaluation.

[68] For example, goal or outcome evaluations which can also analyse the process of how the objectives of a programme has been achieved or failed to be achieved.

[69] There are various perspectives on the core characteristics of a theory-based evaluation. We have adopted the elements cited by Coryn *et al.* (2011).

Annex B Detail on evaluation findings

B.1 Proposed revisions to the TOC

In line with the feedback given in Section 3.5.4, the positions of the logframe indicators have been adjusted below, with some Outputs moved to Outcomes, and some Outcomes move to Impacts. Additional causal links were also added that were uncovered over the course of the evaluation.



B.2 Details on implementation progress

Table 10. Overview of progress against the logframe

Heading	Indicator	Target	Progress
Impact: Increased water security for vulnerable people in Tanzania	Number of legal permissions for water resource use granted, monitored and complied with across Tanzania and in Pangani, IDB, Rufijji and Wami-Ruvu basins	4,211 WUP issued nationally; 1,278 WUP inspections; 7 enforcement actions; 22 discharge permits issued; 68 inspections of discharge permits (20% increase over baseline)	In 2013/14: 4,133 WUP issued; WUP inspections and enforcement actions not reported; 24 discharge permits issued (provisional); 146 discharge permit inspections carried out (26% non-compliance) (WSSR 2015, p.9)
	Number of conflicts over water resources (CC6)[2] reported and resolved (nationwide)	42 water conflicts reported (20% increase) and 9 unresolved (20% decrease)	Conflicts not reported on in WSSR, despite keeping a conflicts register existing as a statutory duty
Outcome: Vulnerable people living in Pangani, Wami-Ruvu, Rufiji and IDB in Tanzania, have secure, legally recognised and protected access to water resources	Number of people within project case study communities with improved legal recognition and protection of water resources as a result of responses to Mashahidi APs (applications approved/follow-up action taken)	Legal registration/protection in place for water resources used by 240,000 (100 %) of case study community (>50% female)	Actions taken to improve water security for 269,000 people, of these 159,270 people have improved water security at project close
	Annual level of funding allocated to WRM in Tanzania via the Division of Water Resources, and channelled to frontline delivery through Basin Water Offices	30% increase over baseline levels ($22,716,032 in 2012/13); Total budget channelled to BWBs doubled	477% increase over baseline ($83,368,283 released; WSSR 2015, p.5). Basin funding TBC
	Number of organisations and countries reporting likely uptake of systematic SAM approaches for improved WRM	Organisations from 20 countries (30% of FAN coverage) reporting intent to implement SAM methodology	30 CSOs from 20 countries
Output 1: Vulnerable people in target areas are enabled to analyse and document their situation, identifying priorities for action to improve WRM	Numbers of community members involved in participatory analysis, planning and training in WRM	580 (260 female)	603 (235 female)
	Numbers of people recruited as 'Mashahidi wa Maji' and involved in participatory analysis, planning and training in WRM	75 (25 female)	84 people volunteered (26 female); 37 recruited across 8 sites
	Numbers of Mashahidi reporting greater understanding of legal rights, obligations and institutional responsibilities relating to water security, and new intent to act	60 (20 female)	78 people (23 female)
Output 2: Vulnerable people in target areas	Number of beneficiaries reached by the project's outreach activities	580 (260 female)	584 (235 female)

have greater awareness and knowledge to leverage legal entitlements and action for improved water and environmental resource management in river basins	Number of people reporting improved awareness of water resource rights, obligations and institutional responsibilities	464 (208 female)	545 (207 female)
	Number of actions within Mashahidi APs undertaken within cohort communities to leverage water rights and entitlements (applications for water rights, enquiries on EIA, pollution control, flood and drought control, conflict resolution and WUA formation)	48 (applications for water rights [22], enquiries on EIA [6], pollution control [9], conflict resolution [5], flood and drought control [3] and WUA formation[3])	87% (41) of the 55 APs implemented (8 more APs were drawn up in two in areas that were later suspended until Phase II)
Output 3: CSO representatives and government actors are enabled to document and track public expenditure on WRM, climate adaptation and environmental regulation	Number of participants trained in Water Security Budget Tracking	15 delegates trained (7 female; 6 CSOs; 3 government; 2 academia; 2 media; 2 community members)	22 people (7 female)
	Number of participants indicating new knowledge about budget tracking and capability to apply it in training evaluation forms	12 participants (6 female; 6 CSOs; 3 government; 1 academia; 1 media; 1 community members)	22 people (7 female)
	Budget and expenditure analysis report completed	1 report	1 report
Output 4: Vulnerable people and CSOs in target areas have increased capacity to advocate effectively for improved WRM and environmental regulation	Number of participants trained on advocacy for water security	20 (a. CSOs: 9; b. government: 5; c. academia: 2; d. media: 2; e. community members: 2)	20 people
	Number of training participants reporting acquisition of new skills, knowledge and capability, and intent to apply advocacy in water security	16 (8 female; a. CSOs: 7; b. government: 5; c. academia: 1; d. media: 1; e. community members: 2)	14 people
	CSOs working together within a 'shared platform' to advocate on improved WRM	Joint advocacy report published and recommendations to improve WRM performance included in civil society contributions to JWSR	TAWASANET presented Uhahika findings and Equity Reports at 2014 and 2015 JWSR; CSO seat gained on the NWB
Output 5: Participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning inform outreach of social accountability approaches for water security at the national and international level	Number of people reached through participatory evaluation and lesson-learning exercise at national and regional levels	120 people reached nationally (60M/60F), 3 regionally (2M, 1F)	164 people reached through participatory evaluation and learning about the approach (including from 12 countries in the region)
	Number of organisations and countries to which outputs, methodology and findings are distributed through international learning events	150 organisations in 20 countries	Sharing with 181 individuals from 20 countries via 6 learning events
	Number of organisations and countries reporting new learning and valuable insights as a result of contact with the project	30 organisations, 5 countries	30 organisations in 12 countries reporting new learning and intent to use the approach

.

Table 11. Overview of project sites where some actions were not implemented

Project site	Status of Mashahidi	Status of AP
Msimbazi	All six still active	Five out of six implemented
Ngerengere	Two out of three still active; the ward officer moved jobs	All four implemented (one Mashahidi moved jobs only after action was successfully completed)
Yaeda (not interviewed)	One out of two still active; ward officer no longer active -- potentially because the issue was no longer urgent for the community (CRS built a new well)	One out of two implemented – due to Mashahidi being inactive (issue no longer relevant?), and due to limited contact with the project team
Kilama (not interviewed)	Both (two) are inactive – because the issue was no longer relevant to the community (decided not to pursue the irrigation scheme)	Zero out of one implemented – due to Mashahidi being inactive (issue no longer relevant?)
Fisher folk (not interviewed)	All six are inactive – potentially due to low capacity of CHAWAKI	Zero out of four implemented – due to Mashahidi being inactive, and due to limited contact with the project team
Overall	**28 out of 37 still active**	**41 out of 47 implemented**

B.3 Details on the impacts achieved in each project site

Figure 8. Impacts at project sites with WUP applications



Figure 9. Impacts at project sites exposed to pollution



Figure 10. Impacts at project sites aiming to strengthen local institutions



Annex C Evaluation approach in-country

Figure 11. Map of project sites



Figure 12. TOC elements of the project



Source: First progress report, Nov 2013.

Table 12. Evaluation research schedule

Date	Time	Activity	Venue/Place
7 Feb 2016	15.00	Arrival	
Mon 8 Feb	8.30 – 14.00	Team briefing meeting	Mesuma Hotel
	14.45 – 16.00	Meeting with Kigogo community (10pax)	Msimbazi site
Night in Dar es Salaam			
Tue 9 Feb	7.00a.m	Drive to Morogoro	
	13.00 – 14.00	Meeting with head of Wami-Ruvi BWB	BWB
	14.30	Drive to Ngerengere	
	14.30 – 15.30	Meeting with Bomba la Zambia village (5pax)	Ngerengere site
	16.00 – 17.45	Meeting with community in Kipera village (5pax)	Ngerengere site
Night in Morogoro (Arcopol Hotel – NH, LT + WM)			
Wed 10 Feb	8am	Drive to Mkindo	
	2pm	Meeting with community in Kigugu (20 pax)	Mkindo site
	18:00	Meeting with Jane	
	19:00	Meeting with Ashmani	
Night in Morogoro (Arcopol Hotel – NH, LT + WM)			
Thu 11 Feb	7:00	Drive to Kilombero	
	14:00 – 16.00	Meeting with Mkula Irrigation scheme (15pax)	Kilombero site
Night in Ifakara (Ifakara Health Centre – JJ, NH, LT, WM + SM)			
Fri 12 Feb	8-9:00	Meeting with Rufigi BWB Sub-office: head; CDO	Basin Sub Office
	9:30 – 11:00	Meeting with Kilombero District Staff (District Irrigation Engineer; District Fisheries Officer)	Kilombero DC Office
	[2h drive] 14.00 – 16:30	Meeting with Msolwa Ujamaa Irrigation scheme (2 pax – others could not come)	Kilombero site
	16:00 [4h drive]	Drive to Morogoro	
Night in Morogoro Hotel (NH, LT, WM)			
Sat 13 Feb	11:30-12:30	Meeting with iWASH (Viv Abott)	Arcopol Hotel
	15:00	Meeting with Tyler	
Night in Morogoro Hotel (NH, LT, WM)			
Sun 14 Feb	Rest + final planning for Regional learning event		
Mon 15th – Tue 16th	Regional Learning Workshop – Morogoro Hotel		
	19:00 – 20:00	Meeting with Mamalinda: chair of TaWaSaNet	
Wed 17 Feb	07.00 a.m.	Team Drive to Dar	
	14.00 – 15:00	Meeting with GIZ / Donor partner group on water	GIZ
	16:00 – 17:00	2nd Meeting with Msimbazi community at Kigogo (2 Mashahidi)	Msimbazi site
	19:00 – 20:00	Meeting with Kash	
Thu 18 Feb	8:00 – 9:00	Meeting with DFID: Private sector adviser, WASH adviser, Advocacy adviser, Water Security project manager	DFID
	11:00 – 12:00	Meeting with DWR of MoWI	MoWI
		Meeting on VFM analysis	
Fri 19 Feb	9.30 – 10:30	Meeting with NEMC	NEMC
	14:00 – 16:00	Feedback session at PAC Meeting	Mesuma Hotel

Table 13. List of people consulted

Name	Position	Contact details
Nick Hepworth	WWI Director	nickhepworth@waterwitness.org
Jane Joseph	Uhakika Project Manager	janejoseph@waterwitness.org
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Tyler Farrow	International Programme Officer in Zambia	tylerfarrow@waterwitness.org
Athmani Kayumba	Project core team member (Wami/Ruvu BWB staff)	
Shamsi Mhina	Project core team member	
Dmitris Malapolla	Project core team member	
Prakseda Kalugendo	BWO of Wami/Ruvu BWB	
P. Mavere	Head of Ifakara sub-office (Rufiji Basin)	
Magreth Dionis	CDO of Rufiji BWB	maggie.mjindo81@gmail.com
Bernard Chikalabanmu	BWO of IDB BWB	bmchikarabhani@yahoo.com
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Bonaventure Baya	NEMC Managing Director	dg@nemc.or.tz
Ruth Lugwisha	Head of Enforcement Department at NEMC	ruthtz@yahoo.com
Steven Masaga	Assistant District Fisheries Officer (Iringa)	
Godfrey Sanga	District Water Engineer (Kilombero)	0754 477702
Ramano Mireye	DIE (Iringa)	07899 44863
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Amaniel Nsaaiya	Chairperson of donor partner group on water	nsaaiya.amaniel@dpg-water.org
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Lotte Feuerstein	WWI workshop participant	lfeuerstein@win-s.org
WWF staff member	WWI workshop participant	
Policy Forum staff member	WWI workshop participant	
George Bagomwa	WWI workshop participant	geobagomwa@yahoo.com

Table 14. Community members met, including Mashahidi

Community name	Numbers of people met
Kigogo community, Msimbazi site	Six women, four men
Bomba la Zambia village, Ngerengere site	One woman, one man
Kipera village, Ngerengere site	Three women, two men
Kigugu village, Mkindo site	Seven women, ten men
Mkula Irrigation scheme, Kilombero site	Two women, eight men
Msolwa Ujamaa Irrigation scheme, Kilombero site	One woman, one man